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ABSTRACT
New Insights from Emerging Types of Loyalty Programs
Valeria Stourm
Eric T. Bradlow Peter S. Fader
In a standard loyalty program, a single retailer oﬀers rewards to customers who
stockpile points up to a certain amount. While research on these archetypal loyalty
programs is vast, there is an increasing trend for companies to adopt reward programs
that do not explicitly incentivize customers to return in order to cash-in rewards.
Two examples are linear and coalition reward programs. In a linear program, points
can be redeemed at anytime for any amount. In a coalition program, points can be
earned and redeemed across several partner retail stores.
A chapter titled Stockpiling Points in Linear Loyalty Programs, uses transaction
data from a linear loyalty program in Latin America to examine why customers tend
to stockpile points for long periods of time, despite economic incentives against doing
so (i.e., time value of money). A mathematical model of redemption choice posits
three explanations for why customers seem to be motivated to stockpile on their
own, even though the retailer does not reward them for doing so: economic (value of
forgone points), cognitive (nonmonetary transaction costs), and psychological. The
psychological motivation is captured by allowing customers to book cash and point
transactions in separate mental accounts. The results indicate substantial hetero-
geneity in how customers are motivated to redeem and suggest that behavior in the
data is driven mostly by cognitive and psychological incentives.
A chapter titled Market positioning in a coalition loyalty program: the value of
v
a shared reward currency uses a model of multi-store purchase incidence to infer
the market positioning among popular partners of a coalition loyalty program. The
model shows how the value of a rewards currency that is shared among partner stores
can explain patterns in customer-level purchases across the stores, and how these
reward spillovers are driven by (1) diﬀerences in reward redemption policies among
the partners, (2) product category overlap between stores and (3) geographic distance
between them. By leveraging a devaluation of the program's points that occurred in
our observation period, we demonstrate how the value of coalition points inﬂuences
the positioning of partner stores within the network.
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CHAPTER 1 : A Framework to Study the Emerging
Loyalty Program Landscape
In a standard loyalty program, a single retailer oﬀers rewards to customers who stock-
pile points up to a certain amount. For example, a coﬀee shop may reward customers
with a free drink after 5 consecutive purchases. This mechanism of promised rewards
explicitly incentivizes customers to return and purchase again in the future.
While research on these archetypal loyalty programs is vast, there is an increasing
trend for retailers to adopt new types of reward programs that are structured in a
fundamentally diﬀerent way. In particular, we are observing a proliferation of reward
programs in which retailers do not explicitly incentivize customers to return multiple
times in order to cash-in rewards. As a consequence, reward currencies (or points)
in these programs do not impose future switching costs on consumers. Rewards in
these programs are more fungible and thus more similar to cash than those oﬀered in
classic reward schemes.
Cash is fungible because any one unit of a currency is equivalent in value to any other
unit. In contrast, points in a standard loyalty program in which a single-retailer
oﬀers non-linear rewards, are not fungible. Recall our example of a coﬀee shop that
rewards customers with a free drink after ﬁve consecutive purchases. The points
earned towards the reward on a customer's ﬁrst purchase are not equivalent in value
to those earned on the customer's ﬁfth purchase. The ﬁrst points have less value
because they cannot be immediately redeemed.
What are the challenges faced by managers oﬀering these no-strings-attached fun-
gible reward mechanisms? What are the characteristics of customer behavior in these
1
programs? Why are more retailers starting to adopt these fungible reward struc-
tures? To address these questions, this introduction chapter develops a framework to
highlight key dimensions in which retailers are adapting the fungibility of rewards.
The framework shown in Table 1.1 has two dimensions in which emerging programs
can increase their reward fungibility: (1) the type of reward structure and (2) the
multiplicity of participating retailers. The following chapters of this dissertation
discuss the managerial issues that arise in emerging fungible programs within the
context of this framework.
Table 1.1: Dimensions of increased reward fungibility
Single
Retailer
Multiple
Retailers
Non-Linear Rewards Points as future
rewards at a
store
Points as future
rewards at
multiple
retailers
Linear Rewards Points as store
cash
Points as cash
valid at multiple
retailers
The ﬁrst dimension, the type of reward structure, distinguishes between programs
with non-linear and linear rewards. A non-linear program typically requires customers
to stockpile points up to a certain amount before they can be redeemed. Another
example of a program with a non-linear redemption structure is when the redeemable
value of each point increases in a staggered way, such as when you reach 5000 points,
we'll double your points. The fungibility of points is limited in non-linear programs
because their redeemable value depends on how many points are previously earned.
In contrast, a linear program oﬀers points that are redeemable for a ﬁxed amount,
regardless of how many points the customer has previously earned. The fungibility
of points in linear programs is greater because these can be redeemed at anytime for
2
any amount.
The second dimension is the number of retailers actively participating in the reward
program. Relative to a standard single-retailer program, the fungibility of points
is increased when points earned at one retailer are exchangeable for points earned
at another. While this dissertation focuses on multi-retailer programs with active
participation, it is important to diﬀerentiate these from programs in which multiple
retailers passively participate. For example, points earned at a focal store may not
be directly redeemable at another retailer, but the focal store may allow customers
to redeem their points for gift cards that can be used at other retailers.
The two dimensions determine four quadrants in the 2x2 framework. Quadrant 1
encompasses single-retailer programs with non-linear rewards. While these are the
most common and most widely studied programs, rewards in these are the least
fungible within our framework. Our coﬀee shop example of the standard program ﬁts
in this quadrant because a customer with three purchases cannot immediately cash
in the value of his rewards.
Quadrant 2 encompasses single-retailer programs that oﬀer non-linear rewards. Points
in these programs are analogous to cash, but their use is restricted within a single
retailer. Unlike cash, one unit is not exchangeable for another unit from another
retailer or from another customer.
The second chapter of this dissertation, titled Stockpiling Points in Linear Loyalty
Programs, studies how customers decide to stockpile and redeem points in these
types of more fungible linear programs. The chapter uses transaction data from a
linear loyalty program in Latin America to examine why customers tend to stockpile
points for long periods of time, despite economic incentives against doing so (i.e., the
3
time value of money). The chapter develops a mathematical model of redemption
choice that posits three explanations for why customers seem to be motivated to
stockpile on their own, even though the retailer does not reward them for doing so.
These motivations are economic (the value of forgone points), cognitive (nonmonetary
transaction costs), and psychological (customers value points diﬀerently than cash).
The psychological motivation is captured by allowing customers to book cash and
point transactions in separate mental accounts. The model is estimated on data
from an international retailer from Latin America using Markov Chain Monte Carlo
methods and is shown to accurately forecast redemptions during an 11-month out-
of-sample period. The results indicate substantial heterogeneity in how customers
are motivated to redeem and suggest that behavior in the data is driven mostly by
cognitive and psychological incentives.
Quadrant 3 includes linear reward programs oﬀered by multiple retailers. The in-
creased point fungibility in this quadrant has implications for consumer switching
costs. In single-store programs, points impose switching costs on consumers because
these can only be redeemed at the stores at which they were earned (unlike cash).
Thus, points eﬀectively subsidize future purchases at the places at which they were
earned, analogous to store coupons. In contrast, in multi-retailer programs, points
can be earned and redeemed across several partner retail stores. Thus, points earned
at one store eﬀectively subsidize purchases at another store. In fact, in some multi-
retailer programs, customers can earn points across all stores but they may not even
have the option to redeem points in the store in which these were earned!
The research question of the third chapter of this dissertation focuses on programs in
Quadrant 3. The chapter titled Market positioning in a coalition loyalty program:
the value of a shared reward currency studies how the reward rates oﬀered at part-
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ner stores aﬀect consumer purchase behavior across other partners in the coalition.
It develops a model of multi-store purchase incidence and infers the market position-
ing (landscape) among popular partners of a coalition loyalty program. The model
shows how the value of a rewards currency that is shared among partner stores can
explain patterns in customer-level purchases across the stores, and how these reward
spillovers are driven by (1) diﬀerences in reward redemption policies among the part-
ners, (2) product category overlap between stores and (3) geographic distance between
stores. While conventional models typically compare competitors within an indus-
try, our model positions partners that operate in diﬀerent high-end retail markets
by identifying a latent aﬃnity network between them. Markov Chain Monte Carlo
is used to estimate the aﬃnity network model on transaction data from a European
coalition loyalty program. By leveraging a devaluation of the program's points that
occurred in our observation period, we demonstrate how the value of coalition points
inﬂuences positioning of partner stores within the network.
Quadrant 4 includes non-linear reward programs oﬀered by multiple retailers. Pro-
grams of this type present unique challenges that need to be addressed in future
research. Multi-retailer programs with linear rewards (those in Quadrant 3) already
face unique challenges of how to allocate the liabilities and costs of earned and re-
deemed points across retailers with diﬀerent margins. These challenges are magniﬁed
when rewards are non-linear. For example, if a customer multiplies by two the value
of his points stockpile through purchases at retailers A and B, but then decides to
redeem points at C, how should the costs of the increased value of points be allocated
across the retailers? Airline coalition programs ﬁt in this quadrant. For example,
a customer may gain gold status at the coalition by spending mostly at one carrier,
but the gold status earns him special rewards across all partner carriers. The ﬁnal
5
chapter of this dissertation overviews future research directions that are relevant to
ﬁrms in this fourth quadrant. The ﬁnal chapter also discusses emerging trends that
continue to increase the fungibility of rewards in emerging loyalty programs.
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CHAPTER 2 : Stockpiling Points in Linear Loyalty Programs
2.1. Motivation
The way a loyalty program is designed inﬂuences when customers redeem their re-
wards. For example, certain loyalty programs, such as those oﬀered in the airline
industry, require customers to stockpile points to earn speciﬁc rewards (i.e., reach
30,000 points to redeem a round-trip ticket). Similar programs oﬀer stockpiling goals
such as when you reach 5,000 points, we'll double your points. In these programs,
as more points are stockpiled, the redeemable value of each point increases in a stag-
gered way, as illustrated in Panel A of Figure 2.1. We refer to the design of these
reward structures as nonlinear.
In contrast, in linear reward structures (illustrated in Panel B, Figure 2.1), cus-
tomers cannot increase the value of each point by stockpiling. Because each point
is worth a ﬁxed amount, typically a cash equivalent, customers can easily redeem as
little as one point without the hassle of complicated rules. These retailers do not set
stockpiling goals and do not require a minimum amount of points to redeem.
Figure 2.1: Example of linear vs. non-linear rewards
Panel A: Non-linear Panel B: Linear
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One example of a linear program is Capital One's Quicksilver Cash Rewards credit
card. Cash rewards accumulate online and can be redeemed at any time. Amazon.com
oﬀers similar rewards in which redeemed points reduce the price that is paid. Tesco's
successful Clubcard program began by rewarding every British pound spent with one
point toward store vouchers (Humby, Hunt, and Phillips 2004). What these programs
have in common is that they do not explicitly reward stockpiling points.
Indeed, customers participating in linear programs often face incentives against stock-
piling. Unredeemed points can expire, and they can lose their value if the retailer
enters bankruptcy or alters the program rules. Moreover, by delaying redemption,
customers also forgo the time value of money from delayed rewards. Because lin-
ear programs do not reward stockpiling and unredeemed points may lose their value,
we would expect customers to redeem regularly. Yet they do not! Even in controlled
laboratory experiments, people are hesitant to redeem (Kwong, Soman, and Ho 2011).
As another example, in analyzing data from the linear program studied here, we
found that only 3% of all purchases have redemptions associated with them. These
customers rarely redeem even though doing so could reduce their basket price by
nearly 30% on average. Yet, it is not the case that customers are completely ignoring
opportunities to redeem: 40% of the customers in our panel eventually redeemed
at least once over a 43-month observation period. Why do customers wait so long
between redemptions and stockpile cash-like points in the process? This question is
the focus of the chapter.
We present a model that unites three potential motivations for persistent stockpiling
in a linear program:
8
 The opportunity cost of forgone points,
 Nonmonetary transaction costs, and
 How points are valued diﬀerently than cash.
The ﬁrst is an economic incentive: customers forgo the opportunity to earn points
on purchase occasions in which they redeem. The second is a cognitive incentive:
customers may ﬁnd redeeming to be costly, even if the process is as eﬀortless as
clicking a button at checkout. The third motivation is psychological, based on men-
tal accounting (Thaler 1985). This explanation recognizes that customers may not
perceive points and cash equally. For example, in interviews with customers from a
linear program, one customer expressed sorrow when redeeming points: It makes me
feel sad because I don't have any points left on my card (Smith and Sparks 2009).
Drèze and Nunes (2004) propose a framework in which customers keep two mental
accounts: one for cash and another for points. Customers may experience disutility
when paying for a purchase (Prelec and Loewenstein 1998; Zellermayer 1996), and this
pain of paying can vary by payment method (e.g., cash vs. check vs. card) (Soman
2003). Similarly, the pain of paying may also vary by the type of currency used to pay
for a purchase (cash vs. points). Drèze and Nunes' objective is to enable ﬁrms to set
prices using combinations of cash and points that will minimize customers' disutility
of paying. This objective is not necessary in linear programs, because customers
are always free to pay with countless combinations of cash and points using a ﬁxed
points-to-cash exchange rate. Nevertheless, their two-account framework provides an
excellent foundation to study redemption behavior in linear programs.
We introduce several changes to Drèze and Nunes' (2004) framework to make it better
suited for both the context (i.e., linear vs. nonlinear program) and the decision
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that we focus on here (i.e., when to redeem given the available stockpile vs. which
currencies to use). First, we explicitly incorporate nonmonetary transaction costs of
redeeming. Drèze and Nunes (2004, p. 71) recognize the existence of such costs but
do not incorporate them into their utility model. Second, we add the consideration
of forgone points by allowing customers to value the gains from the points earned
in the program, not just the losses from spending cash and points. With these two
changes, the model captures the ﬁrst two motivations to stockpile. Third, we also
allow customers to subjectively value points less than cash at a ﬁxed conversion rate.
Fourth, we do not restrict our attention to cases in which customers already have
stockpiles large enough to cover the entire price (Drèze and Nunes 2004, pp. 62,
69). This restriction is reasonable for analyzing redemption behavior in nonlinear
programs because, by design, customers are encouraged and sometimes restricted to
wait until they have a large stockpile. This restriction is not needed to study linear
programs because customers can easily redeem when stockpiles are small. Instead,
we examine how redemption choice changes with the size of the available stockpile
relative to total prices.
These changes lead to a multiple-accounts (MA) model that unites economic, cog-
nitive, and psychological explanations for why customers of linear programs can be
motivated to stockpile on their own. The MA model has two dimensions: (1) whether
a customer evaluates gains and losses of cash in a separate mental account from those
of points (i.e., multiple accounts vs. single account) and (2) whether these valuations
within an account are made with value functions that are S-shaped (concave over
gains and convex over losses) or instead linear over gains and losses. Table 2.1 shows
that while the MA model allows for separate S-shaped mental accounts, it nests cases
in which customers have a single S-shaped account (SA), multiple linear accounts
10
(MLA), or a single linear account (SLA).
Table 2.1: MA dimensions to evaluate points and cash
Value functions Multiple Accounts Single Account
S-shaped MA SA
Linear MLA SLA
The MA model predicts that customers stockpile up to a latent threshold, which is not
set by the retailer, but is instead determined by the three motivations to stockpile:
forgone points, transaction costs, and how each customer values points relative to
cash. By allowing for two mental accounts, the relative shapes of the two value
functions can motivate a customer to stockpile. The MA model can be considered
structural (Chintagunta et al. 2006) in the sense that the estimated parameters
directly determine the fundamental costbeneﬁt trade-oﬀ that governs redemption
behavior. While structural models typically rely on standard expected utility theory
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), the MA model is grounded in prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), which governs the
value function shapes, as well as mental accounting, which considers one versus two
accounts.
This chapter examines the MA model in two fundamental ways. First, we analytically
examine the model's implications for stockpiling. Afterward, we build an empirical
version of the model, with a hierarchical Bayes structure, to reﬂect heterogeneity in
how people perceive gains and losses of cash relative to gains and losses of points.
We estimate the MA model along with the nested speciﬁcations given in Table 2.1
on observational data from a linear loyalty program of an international retailer and
show how the three motivations to stockpile diﬀer across customers. This analysis is
useful to identify how customer segments may respond to alternative strategies for
11
encouraging redemptions.
Alternative explanations to those encompassed by the MA model can be drawn from
the literature on nonlinear programs. In particular, while research on nonlinear pro-
grams is vast (Bijmolt, Dorotic, and Verhoef 2010), the ﬁndings often cannot be easily
translated to linear programs. For example, a psychological phenomenon called the
medium eﬀect (Hsee et al. 2003) exists when myopic consumers would make dif-
ferent stockpiling choices if rewards were denominated directly in dollars instead of
in points. The eﬀect is expected when points alter the perceived monetary return of
stockpiling. One driver of the medium eﬀect is a nonlinear exchange rate between
points and cash. Nevertheless, the mere presence of a medium (points) is not suf-
ﬁcient to produce a medium eﬀect (Hsee et al. 2003 p. 3). No medium eﬀect is
expected in linear loyalty programs that oﬀer a ﬁxed points-to-dollar exchange rate
and reward customers with a ﬁxed number of points for every dollar spent, as studied
here. As a second example, the goal-gradient hypothesis (Kivetz, Urminsky, and
Zheng 2006) ﬁnds that consumers tend to exert more eﬀort (i.e., purchase faster) as
they advance toward a redemption goal that is explicitly set by the retailer. Linear
programs do not have such goals. Furthermore, the goal-gradient eﬀect sheds light
on purchasing rather than on the redemption behavior that we are interested in; it
assumes that redemption occurs when customers have stockpiled enough points to do
so.
In summary, we use a model of mental accounting to empirically examine the po-
tential motivations to persistently stockpile in linear programs and how these vary
across customers. Our ﬁndings and documentation of stockpiling behavior in a linear
program respond directly to a call in a recent article for research on how customers
redeem: Though redemptions are critical elements of loyalty programs, we do not
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really know why loyalty program members redeem, or why they do not (Bijmolt,
Dorotic, and Verhoef 2010). Our results can be used to improve communication
strategies to encourage redemptions and may also provide insight into why even in
nonlinear programs, some customers persistently stockpile above and beyond explicit
requirements.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: We ﬁrst describe the data set
to motivate both the theoretical and the empirical parts of the research. Then, we
mathematically lay out MA and explain how it captures each motivation. We specify
an empirical version of the utility model and demonstrate its performance, along with
the other speciﬁcations of the 2 x 2 framework. We then apply MA to characterize
the heterogeneity in customer motivations and assess policies that may potentially
increase redemptions by addressing each of the three motivations. We conclude this
chapter with a summary and directions for future research.
2.2. Program Description
Our empirical setting is a linear loyalty program that has operated for more than
20 years in a prominent supercenter chain in Latin America (the chain has asked to
remain anonymous). It is the market leader in several countries for a range of high-end
product categories similar to those oﬀered by Target, Bed Bath & Beyond, and Home
Depot. For example, the product categories it oﬀers include ﬂat screen televisions,
beds, hardware items, toys, kitchen appliances, home decor items, gardening tools,
and camping equipment.
The data track the behavior of a cohort of customers who ﬁrst signed up for the
retailer's loyalty program in January 2008. For each visit of each individual, over
a 43-month period, we observe the basket price, how many points were earned or
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redeemed, and the date. From these data, we are able to infer the available stockpile
of points each person had at the time of each purchase.
Consistent with our introduction and motivating example, the loyalty program oﬀers
a linear reward policy. In our setting, customers cannot get the satisfaction of paying
without any cash (i.e., they cannot pay 100% with points). Stockpiled points can be
redeemed anytime to reduce up to 50% of the basket price (not including items on sale)
at a constant and easy-to-remember points-to-cash exchange rate. We observe that
this cap potentially aﬀects 40% of redemptionsthat is, those in which a customer
had more points than 50% of the basket price. When the cap is nonbinding, customers,
on average, redeemed points equal to 22% of their basket price.
Furthermore, redemption is a low-eﬀort activity. Customers who want to redeem
points simply show their loyalty card and tell the cashier they want to redeem. While
redemption does not require customers to keep track of their stockpiles, customers can
easily check their balance at the cash register, online, or by phone. Point expiration is
not an important motivation to redeem in this program because any purchase delays
the expiration of a customer's entire stockpile by one year. Earning points is also
simple: a customer presents his or her loyalty card to the cashier to earn 1% of the
total purchase price in points.
In this program, points are not earned on shopping trips when a customer redeems.
Thus, the redeeming customer sacriﬁces an opportunity to earn points on that trip.
This opportunity cost is an economic motivation to delay redemption. Although this
program feature is incorporated in our model, it is only one of three motivations to
redeem. While some programs share this feature (i.e., as commonly occurs when
using points to partially pay for a plane ticket), others reward customers based on
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the portion of the price paid with cash. Our model can easily be modiﬁed to capture
these smaller forgone points by considering unearned points on only the redeemed
amount instead of the full price.
Several features the program lacks suggest that some potential drivers (alternative
explanations) of persistent stockpiling are unlikely to play a large role in this program.
The ﬁrst missing feature is that customers cannot increase the value of their points
by purchasing larger baskets or by stockpiling many points. Recall that in a linear
program, the economic value of points is constant over time, so it does not vary
with the purchase price or with how many points are redeemed at once. Second,
the program does not oﬀer customers any special-tier status or any nonmonetary
beneﬁts based on their stockpiles. Thus, stockpiling in this program is not a way for
customers to signal their status to others (Drèze and Nunes 2009). Third, when a
customer forgets to bring his or her loyalty card for a given purchase, that purchase
is not recorded in the data set, nor can the customer earn or redeem points without
the card.
Consequently, for every purchase in our data set, the customer presented the loyalty
program card, so our model estimation is not aﬀected by purchases in which customers
forget to bring their cards. This suggests that lack of interest in the program or
forgetting about the program are possible but unlikely explanations for the observed
stockpiling in this setting.
2.3. Data Description
The data set contains 346 customers who signed up for the program in January 2008.
We tracked their 10,219 purchase occasions from January 2008 through July 2011.
We use each customer's ﬁrst purchase occasion in January 2008 to calculate initial
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stockpile levels but then exclude this from our analysis because no redemptions could
have taken place during the ﬁrst purchase because customers did not have any points
to redeem yet.
Redemptions are relatively rare in this program: customers only redeemed in 3% of
purchases. Over the entire observation period, 60% of customers never redeemed. We
call these customers nonredeemers. It does not seem to be the case that the high
number of nonredeemers are customers who simply stopped purchasing early during
the observation period, because of the 244 customers who purchased at least once in
2011 (i.e., had more than three years of purchasing experience with the program),
a majority (51.6%) were nonredeemers. Of the 137 redeemers, 69 redeemed once,
54 redeemed two to four times, 12 redeemed ﬁve to seven times, and 2 redeemed
more than seven times. Customers who redeemed are also quite valuable. Relative to
nonredeemers, customers who redeemed at least once over the 43 months had shopping
baskets worth 25% more (p = .008), visited the retailer 141% more frequently (p <
.001), and their recency since the last purchase observed in the data was 164 days
shorter (p < .001). Table 2.2 further details how customer purchase behavior varies.
It shows the distribution across customers of total redemptions, purchase frequency,
total spend, and the maximum points stockpiled over the observation period. The
large dispersions of these distributions suggest that people may diﬀer in how they
value cash relative to points.
Table 2.2: Heterogeneity in customer behavior
Quantiles 0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Total redemptions occasions 0 0 0 1 15
Total purchase occasions 1 11 22 41 253
Total spend (currency units) 17 2,106 4,519 9,331 211,743
Maximum stockpile (currency units) 0 26 49 91 1,285
16
Figure 2.2 shows how the main variables we examine in our analysis (redemptions,
available stockpiles, and basket prices) evolve over time. It shows that while mean
monthly basket prices are highly variable, their level is steady over time. In contrast,
stockpiles exhibit a positive trend. The low levels of redemption rates in the cohort's
early months reﬂect that stockpiling behavior may be diﬀerent during customers'
early experiences with the program while they are building up their points.
Figure 2.2: Redemptions and stockpiles over time
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
re
de
m
pt
io
n 
ra
te
 (%
)
0
20
40
60
80
m
e
a
n
 s
to
ck
pi
le
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
m
e
a
n
 b
as
ke
t p
ric
e
20
08
−0
1
20
08
−0
2
20
08
−0
3
20
08
−0
4
20
08
−0
5
20
08
−0
6
20
08
−0
7
20
08
−0
8
20
08
−0
9
20
08
−1
0
20
08
−1
1
20
08
−1
2
20
09
−0
1
20
09
−0
2
20
09
−0
3
20
09
−0
4
20
09
−0
5
20
09
−0
6
20
09
−0
7
20
09
−0
8
20
09
−0
9
20
09
−1
0
20
09
−1
1
20
09
−1
2
20
10
−0
1
20
10
−0
2
20
10
−0
3
20
10
−0
4
20
10
−0
5
20
10
−0
6
20
10
−0
7
20
10
−0
8
20
10
−0
9
20
10
−1
0
20
10
−1
1
20
10
−1
2
20
11
−0
1
20
11
−0
2
20
11
−0
3
20
11
−0
4
20
11
−0
5
20
11
−0
6
20
11
−0
7
l redemption rate (%)
mean stockpile
mean basket price
In general, stockpiles are large enough to generate nearly 30% in cash savings. Figure
2.3 shows the distribution of the percentage of the basket price that can be reduced
by redeeming stockpiled points. As mentioned, the distribution is capped because
this program allows customers to cash in up to 50% of the basket during any single
purchase occasion. Figure 2.4 plots the monthly averages of these savings. These tend
to increase over time, with exceptions during the months of November and December.
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Figure 2.3: Percentage of the basket that can be reduced
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Figure 2.4: Average monthly potential savings
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Next, we illustrate in an exploratory way how the extent of stockpiling diﬀers from
what we would expect if customers were randomly deciding whether to redeem (i.e.,
ﬂipping a coin). For every customer who redeemed at least once, we generate 1,000
simulations of their redemption choices from a sequence of Bernoulli trials with a
probability of redemption equal to that of their observed redemption rate. We then
compare the average run-lengths (i.e., average number of consecutive purchases with
no redemption) of the observed and simulated sequences of redemption choices. Fig-
ure 2.5 shows a histogram of the diﬀerences between each customer's observed and
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expected mean run-length. The majority of customers stockpile longer (i.e., tend to
have longer run-lengths) than expected by a Bernoulli sequence with the same ob-
served redemption rate. A one-sided bootstrap Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the
null hypothesis (p <0.001) that customers' expected and observed mean run-lengths
come from the same distribution, suggesting persistent stockpiling behavior.
Figure 2.5: Comparison of run-lengths
observed minus expected mean run−length
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2.4. Redemption Model
MA is presented by ﬁrst developing the two dimensions (shape and number of ac-
counts), and then by describing how persistent stockpiling behavior is captured through
economic, cognitive, and psychological motivations.
Dimension 1: the shape of the value function. A value function determines customer
i's perceived value of gains and losses. It is deﬁned over deviations from a reference
point (i.e., current wealth). A function that is linear in both gains and losses is the
simplest speciﬁcation. Equation 2.1 shows our linear speciﬁcation of w(x), which
values gains linearly with a slope aiw and losses with a slope that is steeper than
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gains by a loss aversion parameter λiw > 1.
w(x) =

aiwx if x ≥ 0
−λiwaiw(−x) if x < 0
(2.1)
Alternatively a value function can be S-shaped as proposed by prospect theory: con-
cave over gains and convex over losses. Equation 2.2 shows an empirical speciﬁcation
of an S-shaped value function proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). It ex-
hibits diminishing marginal utility for gains and diminishing marginal disutility for
losses. This is determined by the curvature parameter aiw ∈ (0, 1). The loss aversion
parameter λiw > 1 allows losses to be steeper than gains.
w(x) =

xaiw if x ≥ 0
−λiw(−x)aiw if x < 0
(2.2)
Dimension 2: the number of accounts. We describe customers as keeping both a
points account and a cash account for evaluating possible redemptions and trans-
actions. Consider a customer who cashes in $3 in points on a $10 item. He does so by
paying $3 worth out of his points account and $7 out of his cash account. The $3 are
a loss to his points wealth, and the $7 are a loss to his cash wealth. By redeeming,
he also loses the opportunity to earn $0.10 worth of points (i.e., 1% of the price). This
$0.10 is a foregone gain to his points account. Such debits and credits are evaluated
separately as gains and losses in each mental account. In the MA and MLA models
we let customers have two diﬀerent value functions, one for the cash account, w(x),
and another for the points account, v(x). For notational simplicity, we rescale the
points to the same units as cash (i.e., 1 point = 1 dollar). To consider a customer
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who instead books transactions using a single mental account, let w(x) = v(x) ∀x.
Formally, consider customer i at the cash register on purchase occasion j, who pur-
chases a basket of items with a total price mij. We model yij, the customer's decision
to redeem conditional on a purchase occurring. When the customer does not redeem
(yij = 0), he pays the entire price with cash and earns points on that purchase. When
he instead redeems (yij = 1), he pays in part with his stockpiled points sij and does
not earn any points.
A utility-maximizing customer with two mental accounts chooses to either redeem
as many points as possible (yij = 1), or not to redeem at all (yij = 0). This binary
choice between redeem as-many-points-as-possible or nothing is an implication de-
rived from our model (i.e., not an assumption) when both cost functions grow at
a decreasing rate (DN 2004 p. 63). The binary consideration set is equivalent to
modeling a consumer searching for the optimal redemption amount.
The utility for the payoﬀs are described mathematically next.
Not redeeming (yij = 0): When a customer does not redeem he pays the entire price
mij in cash. Thus, his cash wealth is reduced by −mij, and so he values this loss
with his cash value function: w(−mij). He also earns points worth r% of the price,
where r represents the retailer's reward rate. The gain of mijr new points is valued
with the points value function v(x). Additionally, a customer may subjectively value
points diﬀerently than cash by a ﬁxed subjective conversion rate hi > 0, so this gain
may be perceived as mijrhi dollars, with utility v(mijrhi).
Equation 1 lays out the utility of not redeeming. Eij denotes the utility attributed
to the basket of items. The error term 
yij
ij represents a shock to the customer's
preferences that is observed to the customer, but unobserved by the researcher. The
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errors are independently distributed around zero, so E[
yij
ij ] = 0.
uij(yij = 0) = Eij + w(−mij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cash loss: full price
+ v(mijrhi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
gain: earned points
+0ij (2.3)
Redeeming (yij = 1): When a customer redeems, he pays with a combination of
points and cash. The maximum points he can redeem is naturally capped by the
available points sij and a cap κ on how much of the basket price mij can be redeemed
(as described earlier, in the empirical section we study a program that caps the
amount redeemed at κ = 50% of the price). Thus, by redeeming, the customer spends
s˜ij = min(sij,mijκ) points, and uses mij− s˜ij dollars in cash to pay for the remainder
of the price. He perceives the s˜ij points spent as a loss to the points account worth
s˜ijhi, valued with his points value function as v(−s˜ijhi). Separately, the cash loss
of mij − s˜ij dollars is valued by his cash value function: w(−[mij − s˜ij]). Equation
2 summarizes the utility of redeeming. The customer also incurs a non-monetary
transaction cost cij, reﬂecting perceived time and eﬀort required to redeem. Note
that this customer is forward-looking to the extent that he considers how redeeming
aﬀects points available for future use.
uij(yij = 1) = Eij + w(−mij + s˜ij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cash loss: discounted price
+ v(−s˜ijhi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
points loss: redeemed points
−cij + 1ij (2.4)
Subtracting Equation 2.3 from Equation 2.4, the customer is expected to redeem when
his net utility z(sij,mij) (Equation 2.5) is greater than zero. Equation 2.6 re-writes
this inequality to distinguish the expected beneﬁt of redeeming on the left-hand side,
from the expected cost on the right-hand side.
z(sij,mij) = w(−mij + s˜ij)− w(−mij) + v(−s˜ijhi)− v(mijrhi)− cij (2.5)
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w(−mij + s˜ij)− w(−mij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cash saved
≥ [v(mijrhi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
foregone new points
+ cij]︸︷︷︸
transaction cost
−v(−s˜ijhi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
points spent
(2.6)
The beneﬁt of redeeming denotes the value of the cash saved : the customer only pays
mij − s˜ij dollars instead of the full price of mij dollars. These savings are perceived
as a reduced loss (rather than a gain) in the cash account. The right-hand side shows
three costs to redeem: foregone points, a transaction cost, and redeemed points.
2.4.1 Three types of motivations
As previously mentioned, foregone points are an economic incentive to persistently
stockpile up to a point, while transaction costs are a cognitive one. Note that these
two incentives remain ﬁxed as the customer accumulates more points (i.e., ﬁxed with
respect to s˜ij). The third psychological incentive is captured by diﬀerences in how a
customer values points relative to cash. The model allows customers to value points
diﬀerently than cash in two ways: 1) through the subjective conversion rate hi, and
2) by having separate mental accounts for cash and point transactions.
2.4.1.1 Stockpiling driven by the conversion rate
For a customer who subjectively values points less than cash by hi < 1, the incentive
to redeem inferior points for superior cash grows as he stockpiles more and more
points (regardless of the number of mental accounts). Consider a customer who
has a single linear account: v(x) = w(x). For this customer, the cash saved from
redeeming is w(−mij + s˜ij) − w(−mij) = w(s˜ij) (because w(x) is linear), and the
costs are −w(−s˜ijhi) + [w(mijhir) + cij], so his net expected utility is z(s˜ij,mij) =
w(s˜ij(1−hi))− [w(mijhir) + cij]. Notice that the value of redeeming w(s˜ij(1−hi)) is
positive and grows with s˜ij, while the costs do not vary with s˜ij. Thus, the customer
will ﬁnd himself increasingly motivated to redeem as his stockpile grows. He will
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stockpile until w(s˜ij(1 − hi)) surpasses the value of foregone points and transaction
costs.
When points are not considered inferior to cash (i.e., hi = 1), this incentive to redeem
disappears, but a customer with multiple-accounts can still be expected to eventually
redeem. To see how the relative shapes of the two accounts alone can motivate
stockpiling, we temporarily set the conversion rate hi = 1, and illustrate the incentives
to redeem when the two accounts are linear and S-shaped.
2.4.1.2 Stockpiling driven by booking transactions in multiple accounts
Multiple linear accounts (MLA): Let's compare the costs and beneﬁts from Equation
2.6. The value functions w(x) and v(x) are linear in x, so as redeemable points grow,
the beneﬁts grow at a rate equal to the loss slope of the cash value function w(x),
and the costs grow at a rate equal to the loss slope of the points value function v(x).
With the linear functional form shown in Equation 2.1, the beneﬁts are
w(−mij + s˜ij)− w(−mij) = λiwaiws˜ij,
and the costs are (when hi = 1)
−v(−s˜ij) + [v(mijr) + cij] = λivaivs˜ij + [aiv(mijr) + cij].
When s˜ij is close to 0, a customer has little incentive to redeem: z(0,mij)
=−[aiv(mijrhi) + cij]. As he accumulates points, the beneﬁts can grow faster than
the costs, depending on the parameter values. Net utility z(sij,mij) increases with
sij when the slope of losses is greater for cash than for points: λiwaiw > λivaiv.
Figure 2.6 illustrates how the costs and beneﬁts of redeeming evolve with s˜ij when
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this condition is met. In the ﬁgure, the net utility of redeeming is positive for any
stockpile value greater than s∗, the point at which a customer becomes indiﬀerent
between redeeming or not.
Figure 2.6: Cost-beneﬁt tradeoﬀ for MLA
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Multiple S-shaped accounts (MA): Similarly, when the two-accounts are instead
S-shaped, a customer will eventually redeem as he accumulates points if the slope of
losses is suﬃciently steeper for cash than for points. Additionally, the current basket
price now inﬂuences how many redeemable points are needed to entice redemption.
In other words, ∂z/∂s˜ is a function of not only s˜ij but also of mij due to the
non-linearity of the value functions. Using the S-shaped functional form shown in
Equation 2.2 with hi = 1, the beneﬁts are
w(−mij + s˜ij)− w(−mij) = −λwi(mij − s˜ij)awi + λwi(mij)awi ,
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while the costs are
−v(−s˜ij) + [v(mijr) + cij] = λvi(s˜ij)avi + [(mijr)avi + cij],
and so the net expected utility of redeeming is
z(sij,mij) = −λwi(mij − s˜ij)awi + λwi(mij)awi − λvi(s˜ij)avi − (mijr)avi − cij. (2.7)
As s˜ij increases, the beneﬁts grow at an increasing rate and the costs grow at a
decreasing rate. A growing stockpile will lead to a positive net expected utility of
redeeming if the slope of losses is suﬃciently steeper for cash than for points (i.e.,
aiw > aiv). Figure 2.7 illustrates how the cost-beneﬁt tradeoﬀ evolves with s˜ij when
aiw > aiv. In the ﬁgure, the beneﬁts surpass the costs for all stockpile levels above
s∗, the point at which a customer becomes indiﬀerent between redeeming or not.
Figure 2.7: Cost-beneﬁt tradeoﬀ for MA
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Since the value functions are S-shaped, it may be possible that w(x) is steeper than
v(x) for large losses but not for small losses. This occurs when aiw > aiv and λiw < λiv
(i.e., the points account has a greater degree of loss aversion than the cash account).
An indiﬀerence point s∗ can still be reached as long as w(x) is steeper than v(x) for
large losses (i.e., when there are many points available to redeem). See Appendix 1
for a formal proof.
Having shown how MA explains persistent stockpiling behavior through the economic,
cognitive, and psychological motivations, we complete the empirical speciﬁcation.
The propensity to redeem can be written in closed form by assuming that the errors
yij are independently and identically distributed Gumbel1. As a result, we model
the redemption choice yij from a Bernoulli distribution with a probability pij, where
logit(pij) = z(sij,mij). We also let transaction costs ci be ﬁxed across the purchases
of each individual. The empirical MA model and its special cases are summarized
in Table 2.3. Due to the linearity of the value functions, MLA and SLA lead to the
same empirical model, which we will refer to only as SLA.
Table 2.3: Summary of empirical speciﬁcations
Model logit(pij)
MA −ci − λwi(mij − s˜ij)awi + λwimawiij − λvi(s˜ijhi)avi − (mijrhi)avi
SA −ci − λi(mij − s˜ij)ai + λimaiij − λi(s˜ijhi)ai − (mijrhi)ai
SLA/MLA −ci + βsis˜ij + βmimij
The logit of MA's redemption propensity is equivalent to the net utility shown in
Equation 2.7. The model allows aiw to be either greater than, equal to, or less than
aiv (so it does not restrict the slope of losses to be steeper for cash than for points).
1The error term yij corresponds to 1ij and 
0
ij from Equations 1 and 2
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Note that MA is able to capture an interaction between redeemable points s˜ij and
basket price mij and can reﬂect framing eﬀects. For example, since the loss function
is concave, a $5 savings over a $10 purchase is valued more than a $5 savings on
a $20 purchase (Thaler 1985, Tversky and Kahneman 1981). SA sets w(x) = v(x)
(i.e., λiw = λiv and aiw = aiv). SLA further restricts w(x) to be linear instead of
S-shaped.
2.4.2 Bayesian speciﬁcation
We complete the empirical speciﬁcation by modeling individual diﬀerences through a
hierarchical Bayes framework, which allows for heterogeneity across customers in how
they value points relative to cash (Rick, Cryder, and Loewenstein 2008). A hierar-
chical Bayes model is ideally suited to analyze behavior at the individual level in this
case because it leverages data on rare redemption occasions across customers. A prior
distribution on the individual-level parameters allows the model to partially pool data
across individuals. For MA, let βi represent a vector of the transformed individual-
level parameters: βi =[log(λwi − 1),log(λvi − 1), logit(awi), logit(avi), logit(hi), ci].
These transformations restrict the loss-aversion parameters to be greater than one
and the curvature parameters as well as the conversion rate hi to be between 0 and
1. The vector βi is assumed to follow a multivariate normal prior distribution with
mean µ and a precision matrix Ω (Equation 2.8).
βi ∼ MVN(µ,Ω) (2.8)
The prior mean µ is chosen to be a vector of zeros. Since this prior distribution governs
the transformed parameters βi, the prior means of the untransformed parameters are
2 for λwi and λvi and 0.5 for awi, avi, and hi. The prior precision matrix Ω is a diagonal
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identity matrix, meaning that on the untransformed scale, 99.7% (i.e., within three
standard deviations) of the prior draws for λwi and λvi lie between 1.05 and 21.08,
and 99.7% of the prior draws for awi, avi, and hi lie between 0.05 and 0.95.
To complete our Bayesian model speciﬁcation, as is standard (Gelman et al. 2003),
let µ follow a conjugate multivariate normal with mean µ0, and precision Ω0, and
let Ω−1 follow a conjugate Wishart distribution with ρ degrees of freedom and an
inverse scale matrix R. The hyperparameters are chosen as identity matrices for
Ω0 and R
−1, a zero vector for µ0 and the dimension of the covariance matrix for ρ
to make it proper (i.e., 5 for MA). We use the same speciﬁcations of the prior and
hyperprior distributions for SA and SLA. For SA, βi excludes λv and av. For SLA,
βi = [βsi,βmi,ci] and Ω is chosen to be a diagonal matrix times 0.5.
We estimate these speciﬁcations using a MCMC sampler with OpenBUGS software.
Population-level parameters are sampled from their marginal posterior distributions.
These can be directly sampled due to their conjugate hyperpriors. Individual-level
transformed parameters βi are sampled from p(βi|µ,Ω, y) (Equation 2.8) with an
adaptive Metropolis block sampler.
Next we describe how the net utility for each speciﬁcation evolves with observed
stockpile levels sij and basket prices mij. These diﬀerences provide alternative and
empirically testable stockpiling mechanisms.
2.5. Empirical Identiﬁcation
Due to the novelty of MA and its highly non-linear nature, we conducted a simula-
tion study to demonstrate parameter recovery for datasets of the size and sparsity
used here (see Appendix 2). Analytically, the parameters are identiﬁed by the non-
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linearity of the value functions. Empirically, the parameters are identiﬁed by the
variation in both basket prices and stockpiles across purchases associated with and
without redemptions. To elaborate on this, we examine how redemption propensity
is inﬂuenced by an increase in both points and basket price.
The equations in Table 2.4 delineate when additional points may lead to an increase
or instead a decrease in a customer's net utility to redeem (z). For simplicity the
subscripts are omitted on m and s˜. The predictions of each speciﬁcation diﬀer by
how ∂z
∂s
varies with prices and stockpiles. For SLA, the simplest speciﬁcation, an
increase in redeemable points can increase or decrease net redemption utility in a
constant manner, depending on the sign of βsi. For MA and SA, ∂z/∂s˜ varies with
both s˜ij andmij, meaning that an increase in points inﬂuences redemption propensity
diﬀerently depending on stockpiled points and basket price. A single-account model,
as previously explained, requires points to be perceived inferior to cash to predict
redemptions.
For MA, when the relative shapes of the two accounts meet the condition that
λwiawi > λviavi, then additional points can allow ∂z/∂s˜ to become positive when
s˜ is suﬃciently large relative to price. Consider two customers who are each about
to purchase a $10 basket of goods. Customer A has an $8 stockpile and Customer B
has a $1 stockpile. If the company gave each customer 1 additional point, MA can
expect this point to increase the propensity to redeem only for A.
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Table 2.4: Summary of ∂z/∂s˜ for speciﬁcations
Model ∂z/∂s˜
MA [λwiawi(m− s˜)awi−1]− [λviavihavii (s˜)avi−1]
SA λiai[(m− s˜)ai−1 − haii (s˜)ai−1]
SLA βsi
Now we examine how an increase in basket price inﬂuences redemption propensity.
Table 2.5 shows ∂z/∂m for each model. SLA predicts that an increase in price either
increases or decreases net expected utility in a constant manner, depending on the
valence of βmi. For MA and SA, ∂z/∂m is negative regardless of the parameter
values, meaning that at the individual-level, these models expect larger prices to be
associated with less redemptions conditional on s˜.
Table 2.5: ∂z/∂m for speciﬁcations
Model ∂z/∂m
MA λwiawi[m
awi−1 − (m− s˜)awi−1]− avi(rhi)avimavi−1
SA λiai[m
ai−1 − (m− s˜)ai−1]− ai(rhi)aimai−1
SLA βmi
The next section discusses the empirical results and examines how diﬀerent types of
individuals seem to vary by how strongly they consider the economic, cognitive and
psychological motivations to persistently stockpile.
31
2.6. Empirical Results
We separate the data of the linear loyalty program into in-sample and out-of-sample
datasets. The in-sample data (January 2008 - August 2010, 7557 purchases) is used
to estimate the models. Three independent MCMC chains were run from diﬀerent
starting values, thinning every 50 samples. Convergence was determined using the
Gelman and Rubin (1992) diagnostic of between-to-within chain variance. We ran
each model for 5000 iterations and the last 3000 iterations of each chain (9000 draws
in total) were used for analysis.
After estimating each model using the in-sample data, the parameter draws were
used to generate predictive distributions (and posterior point estimates) for a sub-
stantial 11-month out-of-sample period (September 2010 - July 2011, 2662 purchases).
Obtaining accurate out-of-sample forecasts is challenging because these were not gen-
erated using the observed out-of-sample redemption choices. Instead, we used a re-
cursive forecasting approach to ensure that forecasts are generated from stockpiles
that are consistent with previously predicted redemption choices. For each draw, the
stockpiles at each out-of-sample purchase occasion are updated using a customer's
forecasted previous redemption choice as shown in Equation 2.9. This approach is
analogous to how Erdem, Imai, and Keane (2003) predict ketchup purchases by up-
dating households' latent ketchup inventories with previously forecasted purchases.
si(j+1) =

sij + rmij if y
predicted
ij = 0
sij − s˜ij if ypredictedij = 1
(2.9)
Sustaining accurate forecasts during the long 11-month out-of-sample time frame
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is particularly challenging in our setting for two reasons. First, errors compound
over time through the stockpiles. Early errors in redemption predictions are carried
over through the stockpile levels. Second, the models must extrapolate customer
behavior as the stockpiles of some customers grow beyond their in-sample levels.
Recall Figure 2, which shows mean monthly prices and stockpiles across the in-sample
and out-of-sample periods. While stockpiles tend to grow smoothly over time, basket
prices are more volatile and do not exhibit a simple time trend. In contrast to
most longitudinal analyses, we are more reliant on using the out-of-sample period
to assess model validation since redemption behavior seems substantially diﬀerent at
the start of the calibration period and then gradually evolves to a steadier pattern
(as per Figure 2). To assess model ﬁt across the empirical models, we break our
assessment into ﬁt at the aggregate and individual-level. The former provides an
overall assessment while the latter is done to reﬂect the heterogeneity that may exist
in customer motivations to persistently stockpile.
2.6.1 Overall Model Fit
Overall model ﬁt is evaluated with the deviance information criterion (DIC)2 (Spiegel-
halter et al. 2002) and the negative of the log marginal density (LMD). LMD is
calculated using the harmonic mean of the likelihood values evaluated at the pos-
terior draws (Newton and Raftery 1994, Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch 2005). For
both DIC and -LMD, a lower measure indicates a better model ﬁt. In our context,
DIC may be the more reliable measure because the harmonic mean of the likelihood
values evaluated at the posterior draws can be heavily inﬂuenced by a few small out-
lying draws. Table 2.6 shows these measures for three periods in the data: 2008 (the
2We utilized the median rather than the mean to compute DIC due to a few outlying draws.
This may be due to the highly non-linear nature of MA.
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cohort's ﬁrst year in the program), the remainder of the in-sample period (January
2009 - August 2010), and the out-of-sample period (September 2010 - July 2011).
These measures are supplemented with Figure 2.8, which compares actual and ex-
pected bimonthly redemptions3. As explained in the data description, the diﬀerent
patterns in behavior during 2008 may be due to larger psychological transaction costs
of redeeming when a customer joins the program, which may decrease as customers
become more familiar with the retailer.
Table 2.6: Deviance Information Criterion and (-Log Marginal Density)
in-sample (2008) in-sample (2009+) out-of-sample
MA 698.0 (352.9) 1139.5 (577.5) 945.9 (872.5)
SA 734.8 (372.3) 1187.0 (597.3) 866.8 (1209.7)
SLA 646.3 (310.6) 1065.2 (506.2) 2998.8 (2052.3)
Figure 2.8: Bimonthly redemptions
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In-sample, all three speciﬁcations perform similarly in aggregate. However, during
3MA can partially capture seasonal holiday variation (as shown in Figure 8) without the use of
holiday dummies because it conditions on purchase behaviors (i.e., frequency and prices) which also
tend to systematically vary during the holiday season.
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the 11-month out-of-sample period, MA and SA sustain predictions that closely track
observed redemptions across time, while SLA is less successful.
We now examine each model's ability to forecast the aggregate out-of-sample dis-
tribution of redemptions across customers. The sum of squared errors between the
actual and expected number of customers who made 0 to 5 redemptions during the
out-of-sample period (5 redemptions was the maximum observed) are 25 for MA,
101 for SA, and 271 for SLA. In summary, MA then followed by SA are better able
to forecast aggregate patterns in redemption behavior relative to SLA. However, de-
spite SLA's poor aggregate forecasts, a simple one-account model may still be the
appropriate model for some individuals, a fact we explore next.
2.6.2 Diﬀerences in motivations across customers
MA's ability to capture economic, cognitive and psychological motivations to stockpile
can provide insight to managers seeking ways to better manage their programs. Many
retailers closely monitor redemptions because these not only determine a program's
costs and liabilities, but also indicate a program's eﬀectiveness and helps them to
identify valuable customers. MasterCard advisor Bob Konsewicz suggests retailers
to encourage redemptions: encouraging and driving redemptions allows members
to engage in and experience the value proposition of the program, and the sooner
they do that, the better! (Konsewicz 2007, Kwong, Soman, and Ho 2011). Colloquy
and Swift Exchange echoes Mr. Konsewicz after ﬁnding that more than one third
of the $48 billion rewards issued in the US each year are never redeemed (Hlavinka
and Sullivan, 2011). As an example, Amazon automatically prompts Discover card
customers to redeem at checkout. Should Amazon change the way it highlights the
reward balance (as shown in Figure 2.9), and instead frame rewards in terms of gains
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and losses, such as: Save up to $22.07! Apply rewards to reduce your price? Are
high-value customers who have never redeemed likely to respond more favorably to
monetary incentives?
Figure 2.9: Redeeming credit card's point stockpile at Amazon checkout
Customers may respond diﬀerently to various incentives depending on what motivates
them to stockpile. As a ﬁrst step to evaluate how each of the three motivations
(economic, cognitive and psychological) diﬀers at the individual level, we examine the
posterior distributions of MA's parameter values (Table 2.7). In the discussion that
follows, parameters without the i subscript refer to the untransformed population-
level parameters µ, and those with the subscript refer to individual-level estimates.
Table 2.7: Posterior distribution of MA's population-level parameters
Parameter Mean 2.5% Bound 97.5% Bound
λw 1.21 1.07 1.45
λv 1.78 1.28 2.74
aw 0.347 0.273 0.415
av 0.020 0.007 0.042
h 0.523 0.172 0.865
c 1.794 0.937 2.499
Recall that persistent stockpiling can arise from two ways of valuing points diﬀerently
than cash. The ﬁrst is a ﬁxed conversion rate hi. Note from Equation 2.7 that hi only
appears in the MA likelihood as havii . Across individuals, the 95% posterior interval
for havii ranges from 0.978 to 0.984, suggesting some impact in how cash is valued
relative to points but one that is unlikely to be a major determinant of redemption
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choice. The second is diﬀerences in accounts. MA indicates a generally steeper loss
curve for cash than points, since the curvature parameters are greater for cash than
for points (i.e., aw > av) at the population level. At the individual level, the 95%
posterior interval for aiw - aiv is also positive, ranging from 0.296 to 0.376 (i.e., greater
than 0 for every customer).
The following indicators use the posterior means computed from the MCMC sampler
draws to compare the three motivations to stockpile. The last ratio summarizes
diﬀerences between the cash and points accounts. The closer this account diﬀerences
ratio is to 0, the more similar the accounts. We evaluate the ratio at a basket size of
x = 10.
 Economic motivation: mean((mijr)avi) (i.e., the mean value of foregone points
for each individual)
 Cognitive motivation: ci
 Psychological motivation: hi and λwi(x)awi/λvi(x)avi − 1
These indicators are used to segment customers using K-means clustering. Table
2.8 shows the standardized indicator means of the segments with sizes 142, 118,
and 87 respectively. Although the exchange rate hi was used to segment customers,
removing it did not impact the segmentation, which is consistent with our previous
ﬁnding suggesting that this factor is unlikely to be a major determinant of redemption
choice.
The three scatter plots in Figure 2.10 show how the standardized indicators vary
across customers. As shown in the third panel, ﬁxed costs and account diﬀerences are
highly correlated: customers in segment 3 have both low ﬁxed costs and accounts that
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are very diﬀerent from each other, while customers in segments 1 and 2 have high ﬁxed
costs and accounts that are more similar to each other. A single-account model may
be adequate for members of segments 1 and 2, who have relatively similar accounts
and are strongly motivated by cognitive ﬁxed costs. Segments 1 and 2 diﬀer in the
magnitude of their foregone points. Adding a fourth segment does not add further
insight (segments 1 and 2 are partitioned into three groups with high, medium, and
low foregone points).
Figure 2.10: How motivations vary by segments
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Table 2.8: Segment means for each standardized motivation indicator
Economic Cognitive Psychological
Segment Foregone points Fixed costs Account diﬀerences Exchange rate
1 -0.67 0.44 -0.43 -0.25
2 0.73 0.51 -0.57 0.77
3 0.12 -1.41 1.47 -0.62
Figure 2.11 compares individuals by their total redemptions and maximum accumu-
lated points. The ﬁrst panel shows that customers in segments 2 and 3 have greater
stockpiles than those in segment 1. The second panel shows that, although these two
groups have comparable high levels of stockpiles, every segment 3 individual redeemed
at least once, while only a few redeemed in segment 2.
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Thus, diﬀerences in redemption behavior seem to be driven mostly by the two cog-
nitive and psychological motivations (ﬁxed costs and diﬀerences between accounts),
which are correlated with each other. Most redeemers are in segment 3. Recall
from the scatter plots that segment 3 diﬀers mostly from segments 1 and 2 based on
cognitive and psychological motivations, and less so for the economic motivation.
Figure 2.11: Redemptions and stockpiles across segments
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2.6.3 Analysis of policies that target each motivation
Having examined diﬀerences in motivations across customers, we illustrate how the
MA model can help managers to economically evaluate potential policy changes to the
program that could lead to higher redemption rates. We consider three hypothetical
policy changes to the linear program studied here. Each aims to lift redemptions
by addressing a particular motivation, so we refer to them as the economic, cognitive,
and psychological policies.
Consider the following three hypothetical policies. The economic policy rewards
points for every basket price (i.e., rm), regardless of redemption choices. Remov-
ing the opportunity costs of redeeming mitigates the economic incentive to stockpile.
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The cognitive policy automates redemptions. It mitigates cognitive costs by auto-
matically reducing a customer's basket price if his stockpile is greater than 15 points
(a 25% discount for the average basket price). Customers still retain the option to
redeem when their stockpile is below 15 points, but since redeeming is automatic,
customers can enjoy rewards more frequently without incurring cognitive costs. Fi-
nally, the psychological policy allows customers to redeem up to 100% of the basket
price, instead of the current actual policy of capping rewards at 50%. Removing the
cap increases redeemable points, and as these increase, the diﬀerences in the mental
accounts of cash and points lead the beneﬁts of redeeming to grow faster than the
costs, so customers may redeem more frequently.
We apply MA to analyze how implementing each of these policies at the start of the
out-of-sample period would impact redemptions as well as the ﬁrm's ﬁnances. Rel-
ative to the current policy, all policies are expected to increase total out-of-sample
redemptions over the 11-month period, as compared to the current policy. The eco-
nomic, cognitive, and psychological policies increase redemptions by 0.6, 17.5, and
3.1 percentage points respectively (Table 2.9). These changes in redemption rates
correspond to the previous results suggesting that behavior in this dataset is driven
mostly by cognitive and psychological incentives.
Table 2.9: Financial analysis of policy changes
Policy Rate Pts. redeemed Pts. outstanding change in redeemed pts
-change in outstanding pts
Current 3.5% 4549 15966 NA
Economic 4.1% 5499 (+21%) 14892 (-7%) 0.75
Cognitive 21.0% 16382 (+260%) 2360 (-85%) 0.87
Psych. 6.6% 9643 (+112%) 10439 (-35%) 0.92
*Redeemed and outstanding points are scaled by some constant
Table 2.9 also compares the ﬁnancial consequences of the policies. In particular, it
compares lost revenue from redeemed points and liabilities from stockpiles outstand-
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ing at the end of the out-of-sample period. The last column compares the costs of
reducing liabilities by one currency unit. Speciﬁcally, it shows the ratio of the change
in additional points redeemed (relative to the current policy) divided by the negative
of the change in outstanding points (relative to the current policy). A smaller ratio
indicates a more cost eﬃcient policy. All else equal (e.g., purchase behaviors), policies
that lead to more redemptions are intuitively more costly overall, since more points
are redeemed, but also lead to larger reductions in liabilities. Interestingly however, in
this dataset, policies that lead to more redemptions are not necessarily the cheapest
way to reduce ﬁrm liabilities. The economic policy is expected to reduce liabilities at
the lowest per-unit cost even though it is the least successful at increasing redemp-
tions. Also note that even though the cognitive auto-redemption policy eﬀectively
reduces the most liabilities, its cost ratio is comparable to the psychological policy, so
it seems to be a relatively cost eﬃcient approach to limit the ﬁrm's point liabilities.
The predictions illustrate how the three policies can inﬂuence redemptions and prof-
itability. However, MA is a redemption model that conditions on purchase behavior,
so its predictions do not account for the possibility that the policies themselves may
lead to changes in how frequently or how much customers purchase. To the extent
that greater redemptions increase customer satisfaction and thus purchase frequency,
the forecasted redemption rates are an underestimate. Analogously, the forecasts for
the psychological policy do not consider potential additional utility that customers
may experience from purchasing a basket for free by paying entirely with points
(Shampanier, Mazar, and Ariely 2007).
41
2.7. General Discussion
Complicated program rules and undesirable rewards are often blamed for low redemp-
tion rates. However, these explanations cannot describe why even in a linear program
with simple rules, redemptions are relatively rare. More generally, current research
has not successfully addressed why more than $48 billion rewards issued in the US
each year are never redeemed (Hlavinka and Sullivan 2011). This chapter provides
insight about redemption behavior in linear programs. An advantage of studying
linear programs is that we can isolate motivations to redeem that do not depend on
the explicit incentives to stockpile present in non-linear programs.
We model how economic, cognitive, and psychological incentives can motivate cus-
tomers to stockpile up to a point even though the retailer does not explicitly reward
point accumulation. The model is estimated on observational data from a linear
loyalty program, and is used to describe how these distinct motivations diﬀer across
customer segments. We ﬁnd that behavior across individuals is mostly driven by cog-
nitive and psychological motivations to redeem (ﬁxed costs and separate accounts),
and less so by economic incentives (foregone points). For retailers seeking to im-
prove their strategies to manage redemptions, our ﬁndings provide insight into how
customers are likely to respond to communication strategies, promotions, and pol-
icy changes (i.e., changing the maximum redeemable points). Future research can
consider to what extent these three motivations can explain why even in non-linear
programs some customers stockpile above and beyond the retailer's explicit incentives
to do so.
Despite the three motivations considered here, we recognize that the observed stock-
piling behavior may be consistent with other alternatives. Appendix 3 investigates
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a rational forward-looking alternative. The results of the MA model as well as ex-
ploratory statistical analyses seem to indicate a lack of empirical support for the
alternative in this data set. Studies with more detailed data are better suited to
explore yet other alternatives. For example, it is plausible to posit that the types of
items purchased may inﬂuence the redemption decision. Customers may stockpile to
redeem as much as possible on luxury items, since paying in points instead of cash can
reduce the guilt of indulging on such items (Kivetz and Simonson 2002). Assessing
empirical evidence for this rival explanation would be challenging in our setting since
customers redeem on an entire basket of items rather than on any single item. Survey
data, if appropriately collected and matched, could be used to learn which item(s) in
a basket prompted a customer to redeem. Redemption choice may also inﬂuence the
types of items that customers purchase. Finally, although we do not rule out the fact
that prices can be dependent on the redemption choice, our multiple-accounts model
predicts a negative relationship between redemptions and basket prices (Table 2.5),
and the data seems consistent with these predictions (the estimated price coeﬃcients
of SLA are negative for most customers). While not a complete account of all possi-
ble stockpiling alternatives, we hope that this research is a good step towards a more
integrated understanding of redemption behavior in linear loyalty programs.
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CHAPTER 3 : Market Positioning in a Coalition Loyalty Program:
the Value of a Shared Reward Currency
3.1. Motivation
A typical single-brand loyalty program encourages repeat purchases by oﬀering points
redeemable for future discounts. While these programs have proliferated, many stores
may ﬁnd them ineﬀective: if customers tend to visit infrequently, they will earn re-
wards too slowly to care about them. Such stores may instead beneﬁt from partici-
pating in a coalition loyalty program: a scheme to provide rewards that can be earned
and redeemed faster and with more ﬂexibility.
In a coalition program, customers collect and redeem points across several partner
stores. For example, a shoe store may reward customers with points that can be
redeemed not only at itself, but also at a clothing store that is a partner of the same
coalition program. The more that a store's customers are likely to purchase at other
partner stores, the faster they will earn points and the more they will value the reward
currency.
How does a coalition's reward currency inﬂuence how customers purchase across part-
ner stores? That is the question we focus on in this chapter. While points in single-
brand reward programs serve as switching costs that deter purchases at competitors,
points from a coalition program instead subsidize other partners since points earned
at one store can be redeemed at another. As a consequence, some stores may exert
positive reward spillovers to other partners while others may exert negative ones.
Measuring reward spillovers can help coalition program managers assess the mix of
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partners in the coalition and to identify partners that provide indirect value to the
coalition. Interestingly, successful coalition programs in Europe tend to include hun-
dreds of competing retailers (i.e., Nectar in the UK), while emerging coalition pro-
grams in the United States tend to include few partners that do not sell the same
product categories. One recent example is Plenti, an American coalition program
launched in 2015 with partners such as AT&T, Exxon Mobil, Macy's, Nationwide
Insurance, Rite Aid Pharmacy, and Hulu.
While academic research on coalition programs is nascent, a recent study by Dorotic
et al. (2011) failed to ﬁnd spillover eﬀects of store-speciﬁc point promotions for the
top ﬁve non-competing retailers of a Norwegian coalition program. Our study will use
data that overcomes two limitations present in their dataset that enable us to better
detect reward spillovers. First, most promotions in their dataset were contingent on
a relatively high level of spend (30 euros) and so may only have changed the behavior
of a small subset of customers. Second, store sales were recorded at the weekly level,
so customer heterogeneity could not be accounted for in their study.
Reward spillover eﬀects have been found in a related setting. Pancras, Venkatesan
and Li (2015) show that a particular focal restaurant in a city is aﬀected by nega-
tive cross eﬀects of rewards from nearby restaurants but positive cross eﬀects from
restaurants further away. However, their study only considers purchases across direct
competitors (26 restaurants) which each operate their own independent single-brand
loyalty program (i.e., points earned at one restaurant can only be redeemed at that
particular restaurant).
This chapter develops a customer-level model of reward spillovers and estimates it
on a dataset containing rich variation in reward rates across the partner stores of a
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European coalition program. Partners in this program are high-end retailers which
operate in a diverse set of product categories, from jewelry to electronics. Some
partners directly compete by selling goods within the same product categories, while
others do not. Although the partners share a common reward currency, their policies
on how customers can earn and redeem points are diﬀerent. First, the rate at which
customers earn points diﬀers across stores. Second, points can only be redeemed at
select partners. Diﬀerences in earning and redeeming policies across partners are a
common feature in other popular European coalition programs (i.e,. Nectar).
The program we study devalued its reward currency by three-fold during the obser-
vation period. In addition, we observe several changes to store-level reward rates at
diﬀerent points in time. Each of the partner stores that we observe in a particular
city belongs to a national franchise chain. A franchise can choose whether all of its
stores oﬀer either a low, medium, or high level of points for each dollar spent (we
refer to the currency unit as a dollar to maintain the anonymity of the program's
location). Several franchises decided to change tiers during our observation period.
The devaluation, which eﬀectively reduced reward rates across all partner stores, can
be viewed as a quasi-experiment because it was determined by the third-party coali-
tion operator and not by local store managers. These reward rate changes can also
be considered exogenous to local (city-level) reward cross eﬀects because they were
implemented at all national stores belonging to a particular franchise, and further-
more, franchise managers do not have access to the coalition's data on how their
customers purchase at other partners. We provide empirical evidence consistent with
our identifying assumption that the changes in reward rates of any given store were
exogenous to sales at other local partners.
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We estimate own eﬀects and cross eﬀects (i.e., spillovers) of rewards with a model of
purchase incidence across the diverse retailers of the coalition program. Motivated by
Trusov, Bodapati, and Bucklin (2010), a study which uses latent links to determine
inﬂuential customers in a social network, our approach uses links to represent reward
spillovers. Speciﬁcally, we model a network where stores are nodes and links between
them represent reward cross eﬀects sent and received across them.
Latent aﬃnity links capture both positive and negative associations in customer-level
purchase incidence across multiple stores. We denote the latent links as aﬃnity
links because these are parameterized with store-level covariates that are utilized
to explain the strength and type of reward cross eﬀects, including measures of how
similar stores are in terms of both geographic distance and product category overlap.
While conventional store choice models typically compare competitors within an in-
dustry, the aﬃnity links in our model characterize the market positioning landscape
of coalition partners that operate in diﬀerent high-end retail markets. We apply a
heat map to the links to visualize how partner stores compete for customer pur-
chases through the reward rates oﬀered to their customers. By positioning partner
stores with a common reward spillover metric (i.e., the links), even though several do
not sell the same product categories, we contribute to a call for research that can de-
tect relationships among brands (in our case, stores) that lie outside the conventional
deﬁnition of product category (Elrod et al. 2002, p. 230). Finally, the asymmetry
between spillover links received versus sent is quantiﬁed with measures of competitive
clout and vulnerability (Kamakura and Russell 1989). These measures summarize the
degree to which each partner inﬂuences and is inﬂuenced by the reward rates of other
coalition partners.
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We illustrate that the value of a shared reward currency inﬂuences how partner stores
compete with each other through reward spillovers. This work on coalition programs
is also relevant to ﬁrms such as theme parks and casinos which reward customers
across their own umbrella of services. Our results allow both managers of partner
stores as well as third-party managers of the coalition program to better understand
the nature of competition within the coalition.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We ﬁrst describe the data, including a
timeline of the reward policy changes to the coalition program, and provide testable
hypotheses of how changes in rewards may have aﬀected how customers purchase
across partner stores. Afterwards, we develop a multi-store purchase incidence model.
We proceed to present empirical results and conclude with a summary and provide a
discussion of future research directions.
3.2. Data Description
From January 2006 to December 2012, we study customer transactions across the top
15 partner stores (those with the most transactions) located in a European city that
is internationally known for luxury retail. These stores belong to a coalition program
with a wide partner network with presence throughout the country.
Partners are high-end retailers selling highly priced goods in what is known as one
of the luxury capital cities of the world. The mean basket price across them is $134
and the mean inter-purchase time at a store is 10 months. Table 3.1 breaks these
down by store. The range of product categories sold across stores is diverse as shown
in Table 3.2. Some stores sell the same product categories while others operate in
non-overlapping category segments. Each store is a branch from diﬀerent national
franchises. Stores D and E belong to one franchise chain, stores I, L, M and N belong
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to a second chain, and the rest operate under diﬀerent chains. No partner stores
entered nor exited the coalition program during the observation period.
We observe 1560 customers who purchased at least once at these stores. At the start
of our observation period, 44% had already joined the program. Their transaction
data is formatted analogous to a credit card statement, listing each transaction's date,
store, and total basket amount. As is typical with such statements, we do not observe
which speciﬁc items are included in the basket nor purchases made without swiping
the coalition's card. The card also tracks purchases made at the other 101 partner
stores in the city. We deﬁne a customer's purchase occasion as a day in which she
is observed purchasing at any partner store in the city (i.e., not necessarily at one of
the top 15 partner stores).
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of purchases across stores
Store Purchases Customers
Mean basket price Mean IPT (days)
for repeat
customers
A 350 155 87 273
B 487 307 299 429
C 933 125 100 181
D 1264 420 125 263
E 367 89 72 189
F 827 178 37 198
G 415 113 178 285
H 332 162 71 284
I 901 387 128 357
J 1611 487 123 321
K 1022 396 261 353
L 374 113 131 347
M 364 110 109 276
N 630 267 152 284
O 731 407 135 358
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Table 3.2: Categories of top 15 retail partners
Store Store Categories Accepts
vouchers
A Clothing No
B Watches/jewelry Yes
C Health Yes
D Clothing, Home/furniture, Shoes No
E Clothing, Home/furniture, Shoes No
F Health, Chemist supplies Yes
G Clothing No
H Clothing Yes
I Sport, Shoes Yes
J Clothing No
K Home/furniture, Electronics/Multimedia Yes
L Sport, shoes Yes
M Sport, shoes Yes
N Sport, shoes Yes
O Entertainment, General food, Restaurant/bar,
Clothing
Yes
3.2.1. Changes to reward policies
The value of the coalition's rewards was aﬀected by changes to both the value of
points and to the number of points awarded per dollar spent. These decisions were
implemented at the national level by both franchise-level managers and the third-
party coalition operator. Table 3.3 presents the reward rates (i.e., the dollar value of
points earned per $100 dollars spent) oﬀered by each store during each of the seven
time epochs during which rates remained unchanged within an epoch across all stores.
The timeline in Figure 3.1 marks with a V the six dates in the data during which
reward rates changed at any of the stores.
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Table 3.3: Dollar value of rewards earned for $100 spent at each store
Epoch 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Start date 01/06 10/06 01/07 02/07 09/09 11/09 04/11
A 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.5 0.5
B 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
C 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.5 0.5
D 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.2
E 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.2
F 3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.5 0.5
G 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 0.2
H 1.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 0.5 0.5
I 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
J 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 0.2
K 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.5 0.5
L 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
M 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
N 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
O 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0
Note: The time epochs are between following dates: 01/01/2006, 10/12/2006, 01/05/2007, 02/01/2007, 09/01/2009,
11/20/2009, 04/05/2011, 12/07/2012 and are marked in the timeline of policy changes to the reward program.
Figure 3.1: Timeline of policy changes to reward program
.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 END
Change in voucher policy
Points devalued by a third
V: rewards doubled at low tier partners
V VV V V V
V: some partners change rewards
First we describe the changes to the amount of earned points. At the start of the
observation period, each partner store oﬀered customers either a low (0.1), medium
(0.5), or high level (1) of points earned per dollar spent. Seven of the top ﬁfteen
partner stores experienced changes in reward tiers throughout diﬀerent points in time.
These changes were implemented nation-wide by franchise managers to all branches.
In addition, in September 2009, the coalition operator increased the amount earned
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from purchases at low tier stores from 0.1 points to 0.2 points per dollar spent. This
tier-level change only applied to stores D and E in our data.
Points themselves were devalued to a third of their original value in November 2009
by the third-party coalition operator. One hundred points became equivalent to $1
instead of $3. Table 3.4 illustrates the impact of this devaluation on the dollar value
of rewards earned for $100 spent at a store from each tier.
Table 3.4: Dollar value of rewards earned for $100 spent at each tier
Partner reward tier Before devaluation After devaluation
Low 0.6 0.2
Medium 1.5 0.5
High 3 1
3.2.2. Identiﬁcation of spillover eﬀects
To determine whether and to what extent reward spillovers occur across stores, our
identifying assumption is that changes in the reward rates of any given store were
exogenous to sales at the other fourteen local partner stores. In other words, changes
in reward policies at a particular store did not occur because of an anticipated eﬀect
on the purchase incidence propensities for the other fourteen stores. The nature of this
setting is somewhat similar to the context of Ozturk, Venkataraman and Chintagunta
(2016), who assess competitive price reactions with the identifying assumption that
car dealership closures represent an exogenous shock to market structure.
First we highlight arguments supporting the identifying assumption and then we
provide empirical evidence consistent with the assumption. Recall the three types of
changes to the value of rewards across stores: (1) the nation-wide point devaluation,
(2) nation-wide changes to low-tier ﬁrms, and (3) nation-wide franchise-level changes
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of reward tiers. The ﬁrst two changes (1) and (2) were made by the coalition operator
which devalued points to improve its margins from transactions across hundreds of
partner stores across the country. Analogously, the operator's decision to change
the number of points awarded by low-tier partners nation-wide was made to reduce
the total decrease in the minimum reward rate after the subsequent devaluation.
Thus, the impact of these coalition-level changes did not occur in response to a store
anticipating an eﬀect on the purchase incidence propensities of the other fourteen
local stores.
Changes of the third type, the franchise-level tier changes, also did not occur in
response to anticipated changes in local spillover eﬀects in the city studied for several
reasons. First, stores do not observe reward spillovers because they do not have access
to the coalition's data on how their customers purchase at other partners. Second,
managers are unlikely to have anticipated the impact of potential changes in the
reward spillovers from other partners in the city because their impact on store-level
proﬁtability is unknown, especially for other partners which do not sell the same
categories. Third, each of the seven stores in our study which experienced tier-level
changes (which aﬀected all branches within a franchise at the national level) belonged
to large franchises with 6-43 branches across the country (Table 3.2).
We present empirical evidence consistent with our identifying assumption. If our
assumption holds (i.e., if changes to the value of store-level rewards were not made
in response to anticipated local spillover eﬀects), then changes in reward rates at a
focal store j should not be predicted by previous sales at other partners j′ 6= j. For
each month t in our dataset, we regress an indicator of whether the value of rewards
at a store j changed at time t on the mean sales at all the other stores at time t− 1.
The slope coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (p-value = 0.22), which is
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consistent with our identifying assumption.
We now present hypotheses of which mechanisms drive reward spillovers across the
partner stores.
3.2.3. Mechanisms driving spillovers
In our model, we will refer to reward spillovers or reward cross eﬀects as a measure of
how much the purchase propensity for one store changes with an increase in the value
of rewards oﬀered by other partners. Note that for each pair of partners A and B,
there are two spillover links. Analogous to a sender-receiver network (e.g., Stephen
and Toubia 2010), store A can be described as receiving a spillover from B but also
sending a spillover to B.
Spillover links can vary in valence (positive or negative) and shape (symmetric vs.
asymmetric). For example, two partners A and B that mutually beneﬁt from each
other's reward rates have spillovers with a symmetric valence, since both directions
(A to B) and (B to A) are positive. Spillovers can also vary across customers and
over time. The next section introduces how our model will capture these spillover
characteristics. Before moving on to that section, however, we ﬁrst lay out hypotheses
on four mechanisms that may potentially drive the characteristics of reward spillovers
across the coalition partners.
Mechanism 1: Reward redemption policies
Periodically, the coalition operator mails paper vouchers to customers for the dollar
value of their earned points. These vouchers are valid for two years. Analogous to how
partner stores oﬀer diﬀerent reward rates, redemption policies also diﬀer across stores.
Throughout the observation period, stores A, D, E, G, J did not accept vouchers from
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customers and the others did.
At ﬁrst it seems puzzling that some partner stores reward customers with points
that cannot be redeemed at their own store, particularly because doing so eﬀectively
subsidizes purchases at competing partners that do accept them. However, this is a
common feature of many large coalition programs such as Nectar in the UK.
Conversations with the coalition operator managers of the program studied here ac-
knowledged that uncertainty of the associated costs is the main reason for why some
partners decide not to accept vouchers. In this program, stores that accept vouchers
are only reimbursed 90% of their value by the coalition operator. Thus, the impact
of accepting vouchers on a store's total margin is uncertain because it depends on
the percentage of the basket price that customers save with vouchers. For example,
consider a store with a 5% margin. A customer with a $20 voucher will thus cost the
ﬁrm $2. For a given purchase, it is proﬁtable (in the short run) for the ﬁrm if the
customer redeems the voucher on a $60 basket but not on a $20 basket.
Despite the costs associated with voucher redemption, partners that accept vouchers
eﬀectively have their products subsidized by the rewards earned across the coalition.
Thus, we expect to observe these partners beneﬁtting from more positive reward
spillovers, since increases in reward rates provide customers with more points available
to spend at their stores. Correspondingly, stores that accept vouchers should also
beneﬁt more from increasing their own reward rates.
H1: Stores that accept vouchers receive more positive spillover eﬀects from the reward
rates of other stores.
In addition to reward redemption policies, the aﬃnity between partner stores can
determine the type of spillovers between them. Consider an extreme case of a pair of
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stores with zero aﬃnity. Despite sharing a reward currency, these stores are unlikely
to be impacted by each other's reward rates if they cater to completely diﬀerent sets
of customers. The next two mechanisms describe how two dimensions of store aﬃnity,
category overlap and geographic proximity, are expected to determine the types of
spillovers across partner stores.
Mechanism 2: Category aﬃnity
As is common in European coalition programs, many partners sell the same product
categories. Among those that do, reward rates are a competitive lever analogous to
prices. Just like in stand-alone programs, reward rates eﬀectively reduce store prices.
Thus, we expect stores to receive more negative spillover eﬀects from partners that
compete in the same categories.
H2: Pairs of stores that compete in the same product categories experience more
negative cross eﬀects from each other.
The overlap in product categories sold (see Tables 3.2 and 3.5) is measured with the
Jaccard similarity coeﬃcient, a measure commonly used for machine learning (e.g.,
Netzer et al. 2012). Let Ajc equal 1 if store j sells category c, and 0 otherwise.
Category proximity (i.e., Jaccard similarity) between stores j and k is calculated as
shown in Equation 3.1 and ranges from zero to one. Stores that do not overlap in
any product category have the minimum category proximity of 0, regardless of how
many categories they sell. For example, store A has a category proximity of 0 with
both B and L, even though B sells one category and L sells two. Analogously, stores
that compete in 100% of their categories have a category proximity equal to one.
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ProximityCategjk =
∑
cmin(A
j
c, A
k
c )∑
cmax(A
j
c, Akc )
(3.1)
Table 3.5: Category proximity between stores
Store B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A 0.0 0.0 0.33 0.33 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.25
B 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
C 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
D 1.0 0.0 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.17
E 0.0 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.17
F 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
G 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.25
H 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.25
I 0.0 0.0 1.00 1.0 1.0 0.0
J 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.25
K 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
L 1.0 1.0 0.0
M 1.0 0.0
N 0.0
Mechanism 3: Geographic aﬃnity
The second measure of store aﬃnity is the geographic proximity between the stores
within the city. We expect pairs of stores that are geographically closer to beneﬁt
from increases in each other's reward rates. This may occur because customers may
incur travel costs to explore new neighborhoods in the city, so nearby stores beneﬁt
when a partner attracts customers to a neighborhood through attractive rewards.
H3(a): Stores receive more positive reward spillovers from nearby partners.
Geographic proximity is calculated as ProximityGeojk =
1
geo.distjk+1
, where geo.distjk
is the geographic distance between the stores. On average, two stores are located
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only 2.17 kilometers (less than 1.35 miles) apart, and the maximum distance is 7.8
kilometers (see Table 3.6). If two stores are at the same location, the proximity
measure equals 1.
Table 3.6: Geographic distances between stores (kilometers)
Store A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
A 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 6.7 4.4 3.3 0.0
B 0.0 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 6.7 4.4 3.3 0.0
C 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 6.7 4.4 3.3 0.0
D 2.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.0 1.1 1.1 5.6 3.3 4.4 1.1
E 1.1 1.1 1.1 2.2 1.1 1.1 7.8 5.6 4.4 1.1
F 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 6.7 4.4 3.3 0.0
G 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 6.7 4.4 3.3 0.0
H 1.1 0.0 0.0 6.7 4.4 3.3 0.0
I 1.1 1.1 5.6 3.3 4.4 1.1
J 0.0 6.7 4.4 3.3 0.0
K 6.7 4.4 3.3 0.0
L 6.7 5.6 6.7
M 7.8 4.4
N 3.3
O
We also expect to see a negative interaction between geographic and category aﬃnity.
While a focal store may beneﬁt from the attractive reward rates of a nearby partner if
new customers are drawn to the neighborhood, the net eﬀect is likely to reverse if the
nearby store sells similar product categories, since its attractive rewards eﬀectively
lower the prices of similar goods to the focal store's own customers.
H3(b): Stores receive more negative reward spillovers from nearby partners that also
compete in the same product categories, relative to nearby partners that do not sell
the same product categories.
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Mechanism 4: Coalition-wide policy changes to the program
The last mechanism describes how the 2009 policy changes are expected to have
aﬀected spillovers. Recall that the coalition operator devalued the points currency
by a third in November 2009. To compensate for the devaluation, at the same time
the operator increased the fungibility of vouchers in three ways: (1) by mailing them
more frequently (monthly instead of quarterly), (2) by increasing the denominations
from only $15 vouchers to $5, $10, $20, $50, and $100 denominations, and (3) by
allowing customers to redeem the vouchers up to 100% of the basket price, instead
of previously 30%. Although these two changes to points and vouchers occurred at
the same time, we can discern the eﬀects of each because some partner stores accept
vouchers while others do not. This is because the devaluation should have led to a
decrease in the overall magnitude of spillovers across stores. Also, rewards oﬀered are
worth less, so their impact on other stores should be of a smaller magnitude.
H4(a): The points devaluation led to a decrease in the average magnitude of spillovers
across stores.
The change to the voucher policy, in contrast, makes it easier for customers to redeem,
and so although H4(a) expects the level of spillovers to decrease, we expect to observe
a positive diﬀerence between the spillovers received by stores that accept vouchers
vs. those that do not.
H4(b): The increased fungibililty of vouchers increased the diﬀerence between spillovers
received by stores that accept voucher redemptions relative to spillovers received by
stores that do not accept voucher redemptions.
The next section presents a customer-level model of multi-store purchase incidence
behavior that pools information across both customers and stores to measure reward
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spillovers and detect how these changed with the devaluation to the rewards currency.
The high-end nature of the coalition partners enhances the need to understand cus-
tomer choice across them, as well as the methodological challenges that would arise
due to low co-purchasing behavior. Recall that the mean inter-purchase time of a
repeat customer at the typical store is 10 months. Most customers (44%) only pur-
chased at one of the top 15 stores during the entire observation period (Table 3.7).
Customers who did purchase at more than one store rarely did so in the same day: 2%
of all 15818 purchase occasions included purchases at two or more of the top stores
(Table 3.8).
Although the nature of the coalition program data (sparseness and many stores)
requires a statistical model able to pool data across customers and stores in order to
determine whether reward spillovers occur and to what extent, we do observe some
modest aggregate patterns in the data that suggest the presence of own eﬀects and
spillover eﬀects of rewards. Consider clothing stores D and E which devalued their
reward rate from 3 to 0.3 dollars per $100 dollars spent in February 2007. Yearly
sales (i.e., the number of purchases) at these two stores decreased by 57% in the
following year. At the same time, yearly sales at other top partners that also sell
clothes increased by 35.7%, while sales at other top partners that did not sell clothes
increased only by 16.1%.
Table 3.7: Percent of customers who purchased at n of the top stores
# Stores 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12-15
% Customers 43.9 22.2 12.9 8.3 5.4 3.3 1.7 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 -
Table 3.8: Number of top partners visited on a purchase occasion
# stores 0 1 2 3 4
# occasions 5620 9804 379 14 1
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3.3. A Multi-store Purchase Incidence Model
We observe customer i ∈ {1, ..., I} shopping in the city on Ni purchase occasions. Let
n denote her nth purchase occasion and let t(n) denote the calendar time at which the
purchase occasion took place. The dependent variable yijn equals one if i purchased
at store j ∈ {1, ..., J} at her nth purchase occasion, and zero otherwise.
The net utility of the customer of purchasing versus not purchasing at store j in
purchase occasion n is modeled with a deterministic component Vijn and an error
term ijn that is independently drawn from an extreme value distribution. This leads
to the common logit form for the propensity to purchase given by pijn =
eVijn
1+eVijn
.
Equation 3.2 speciﬁes Vijn as a function of (1) utility that is not related to rates
at which reward points are earned, (2) own eﬀects: utility from the value of the
reward rate Rjt(n) oﬀered by store j at the time of purchase occasion n, and (3) cross
eﬀects: utility from the value of rewards oﬀered by other partner stores k 6= j. This
speciﬁcation is analogous to the utility model of own and cross price eﬀects in multi-
category choices within a store by Manchanda, Ansari and Gupta (1999). Given the
large number of stores considered and the sparsity present in the data, cross eﬀects
in Vijn are speciﬁed to explicitly capture the source of correlation among alternatives,
such that the remaining errors ijn can be considered independent (Train 2003).
Vijn = Non-Reward Utilityij + Own Eﬀectsijn + Cross Eﬀectsijn (3.2)
Non-reward utility is captured with a customer-level intercept αi, a store level inter-
cept λj, and a term capturing each customer's aﬃnity to each store θij. The intercept
λj of the store with the most transactions is ﬁxed to zero to separately identify cus-
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tomer and store intercepts.
Non-Reward Utilityij = αi + λj + θij (3.3)
The eﬀect of store j's reward rate on its own purchase propensity is denoted by
γj→j,i,n.
Own Eﬀectsijn = γj→j,i,t(n) (3.4)
Own eﬀects are modeled as linear functions of a store's own rewards which can vary
across customers i and over time. In particular, recall that reward rates across the
coalition changed six times, leaving seven epochs during which reward rates remained
unchanged.
γj→j,i,t(n) = ωownj,i,t(n)Rjt(n) (3.5)
The weights ωownj,i,t(n) on reward rates are allowed to be diﬀerent for stores that accept
vouchers vs. those that do not. The covariate V oucherj equals one if j accepts
voucher redemptions and zero otherwise. The κ coeﬃcients are allowed to diﬀer for
purchase occasions that took place before and after the program-wide devaluation
(i.e,. between epochs 5 and 6).
ωownj,i,t(oi) = κ0it(n) + κ1it(n)V oucherj (3.6)
We can re-write own eﬀects as:
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γj→j,i,t(n) = κ0it(n)Rjt(n) + κ1it(n)Rjt(n)V oucherj
which includes a main eﬀect for rewards and an interaction term between rewards
and vouchers.
Cross eﬀects from the rewards of other stores k 6= j are modeled by summing links of
an aﬃnity network where γk→j,i,t(n) denotes the spillover link sent by store k to store
j at the time of purchase occasion n.
Cross Eﬀectsijn =
∑
k 6=j
γk→j,i,t(n) (3.7)
A link from store k to j multiplies the reward value oﬀered by k at time t(n) with a
cross eﬀect weight ωcrossk→j,i,t(n) (Equation 3.8) that can vary across customers and time.
γk→j,i,n = ωcrossk→j,i,t(n)Rkt(n) (3.8)
The cross eﬀect weights ωcrossk→j,i,t(n) are a linear function of voucher policies as well
measures of the aﬃnity between stores. Let ACategjk and A
Geo
jk denote the mean-
centered values (over time and across stores) of category and geographic proximity
(ProximityCategjk and Proximity
Geo
jk ). The last term in Equation 3.9 captures an in-
teraction between category and geographic aﬃnity. The next section tests the ﬁrst
three hypotheses using the coeﬃcients of these weights, and hypotheses 4(a) and 4(b)
using the links in Equation 3.8.
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ωcrossk→j,i,t(n) = ψ0it(n) + ψ1it(n)V oucherj + ψ2it(n)A
Categ
jk + ψ3it(n)A
Geo
jk + ψ4it(n)A
Categ
jk A
Geo
jk
(3.9)
By summing across the aﬃnity links we can re-write the cross eﬀects of rewards
as Wjt(n)ψit(n), where the covariates Wjt(n) include aggregate statistics of j's aﬃnity
network.
Cross Eﬀectsijn =
∑
k 6=j
γk→j,i,t(n) (3.10)
= Wjt(n)ψit(n) (3.11)
= ψ0it(n)
∑
k 6=j
Rkt(n) + ψ1it(n)
∑
k 6=j
Rkt(n)V oucherj
+ψ2it(n)
∑
k 6=j
Rkt(n)A
Categ
jk + ψ3it(n)
∑
k 6=j
Rkt(n)A
Geo
jk + ψ4it(n)
∑
k 6=j
Rkt(n)A
Categ
jk A
Geo
jk (3.12)
3.3.1 Policy changes
Let ~βit(n) denote the vector of parameters that characterize both own eﬀects and
cross eﬀects {κ0it(n),κ1it(n),ψ0it(n),ψ1it(n),ψ2it(n),ψ3it(n),ψ4it(n)}. We allow these to reﬂect
permanent changes after t∗ (November 2009), the time at which the coalition devalued
points and increased voucher fungibility. Changes after the devaluation are denoted
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by the vector δ¯={δk0 , δk1 , δψ0 , δψ1 , δψ2 , δψ3 , δψ4}. These parameters δ¯ capture potential
changes after the devaluation to how cross eﬀects are driven by voucher policies and
store aﬃnity.
~βit(n) =

βi if t(n) ≤ t∗
βi + δ¯ if t(n) > t
∗
(3.13)
3.3.2 Prior distributions
Prior distributions are speciﬁed to complete the model. The prior distributions for
the non-reward utility parameters are speciﬁed as follows. The customer-store at-
tractiveness terms θij are normally distributed with a mean 0 and a variance IIσ
2
θ .
Customer intercepts αi each have a normal prior with a zero mean and variance σ
2
α.
The store intercepts λj each have a normal prior with a mean µλ and variance σ
2
λ. For
the hyperpriors, the variances σ2α, σ
2
λ and σ
2
θ each follow an Inverse-Gamma distribu-
tion with shape and scale parameters equal to 0.5. The prior mean µλ has a normal
hyperprior with mean zero and a standard deviation of 0.5.
The prior and hyperprior distributions for the parameters governing own and cross
reward eﬀects are speciﬁed as follows. The coeﬃcients βi have a multivariate Normal
prior with mean β¯ = {κ¯0, κ¯1, ψ¯0, ψ¯1, ψ¯2, ψ¯3, ψ¯4} and variance Σβ. Let K represent the
number of parameters in β¯ (seven in this case). The conjugate prior for the mean
β¯ is a Multivariate Normal with mean zero and variance KIk. The conjugate prior
for the variance Σβ is an Inverse-Wishart with K degrees of freedom and a location
matrix equal to KIk. Each element in δ has normal hyperprior with mean zero and
a standard deviation of 0.5.
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3.3.3 Benchmarks
The ﬁt of the aﬃnity model is compared with two nested benchmarks called OWN
and NRU which both exclude cross eﬀects. NRU only includes non-reward utility
and thus does not include any information on reward rates. OWN includes both
non-reward utility and own eﬀects, but not cross eﬀects. Both of these benchmarks
are consistent with the null hypothesis of no reward spillovers across partner stores.
Because the benchmarks do not model cross eﬀects, these do not contain information
on the geographic and category aﬃnity between stores.
Table 3.9: Summary of empirical models
Deterministic utility Vijn
Aﬃnity network (αi + λj + θij) + γj→j,i,t(n) +
∑
k 6=j γk→j,i,t(n)
OWN (αi + λj + θij) + γj→j,i,t(n)
NRU (αi + λj + θij)
3.4. Empirical Results
A Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampler coded in the R software was used to estimate
the model with two independent chains of 80,000 iterations. The last 40,000 iterations
of each chain were used for analysis after thinning every 20 iterations. Convergence
was determined using the Gelman and Rubin (1992) diagnostic of between-to-within
chain variance.
Parameters governing the prior distributions µλ, σ
2
α, σ
2
λ, σ
2
θ , β¯, and Σβ are sampled
from their marginal posterior distributions. These parameters can be directly sampled
due to their closed-from marginal posterior distributions. Each of the remaining
parameters αi, λj, θij, βi, δ¯ are sequentially sampled from their conditional posterior
distributions using a random-walk Metropolis sampler. The step sizes for each of these
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parameters is adapted during the ﬁrst 20,000 iterations to maintain acceptance rates
between 30% and 40%. Appendix 4 illustrates parameter recovery for the Aﬃnity
model.
First we show the model ﬁt relative to the benchmarks. Then we examine the spillover
links and use them to test the hypotheses. Third, the links are visualized with a heat
map and the asymmetry between links received vs. sent is quantiﬁed with measures
of competitive clout and vulnerability (Kamakura and Russell 1989).
3.4.1. Model ﬁt
The aﬃnity network model improves overall in-sample ﬁt relative to both benchmarks
(Table 3.10), as measured by the mean log likelihood (LL), the deviance information
criterion (DIC) and the log-marginal density (LMD) (Spiegelhalter et al. 2002, New-
ton and Raftery 1994, Rossi, Allenby, and McCulloch 2005). A smaller magnitude
indicates a better ﬁt for each of these measures. The OWN benchmark does not im-
prove overall ﬁt over NRU. The two models have a nearly identical ﬁt with all three
measures. Although OWN has a slightly lower mean log likelihood over draws, the
two are not substantially diﬀerent. OWN achieves a larger maximum draw of the log
likelihood than NRU (-25802 for OWN versus -25812 for NRU). Despite the slightly
lower mean log likelihood, OWN achieves a better DIC because it has a slightly better
likelihood evaluated at the posterior mean of the population-level parameters (-23117
for OWN versus -23121 for NRU).
Table 3.10: Measures of overall model in-sample ﬁt
Model Mean LL DIC LMD
Aﬃnity network -25049 37351 -25367
OWN -26099 40277 -26366
NRU -26092 40299 -26328
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The aﬃnity network model achieves a better overall ﬁt because the spillover eﬀects
allow it to better predict patterns in how customers purchase across stores. To illus-
trate this, Table 3.11 compares the posterior means of three error statistics across the
models. These posterior means are calculated from the error statistics from a large
number of datasets simulated from the posterior distributions of model parameters
(Gelman at al. 2003).
The ﬁrst statistic measures transactions, the second measures store patronage, and
the third measures cross-store patronage. More speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst row shows the
sum of squared errors (SSE) between the actual vs. predicted number of transactions
that each customer made at each store. The second row shows the hit rate of whether
each customer is predicted to have patronized (i.e., made at least one purchase at)
each store. The third row shows the sum of squared errors between the actual and
expected number of customers who co-patronized each pair of stores (i.e., for stores
A and B, the number of customers who purchased at least once at A and at least once
at B). The Aﬃnity model achieves the best ﬁt in each of these measures. Relatve
to NRU, OWN improves predictions of cross-store patronage because the own eﬀects
allow it to improve the ﬁt across time epochs of how customers shop at each store.
Table 3.11: Number of stores patronized by the average customer
Aﬃnity OWN NRU
SSE transactions 13,510 14,500 14,650
Hit rate store patronage 89.5 87.9 88.3
SSE cross-store patronage 14,434 20,958 25,708
Later in this section we will show that stores B, C, and F are found to almost all
beneﬁt from each other's positive reward spillovers. To further illustrate an example
of how the aﬃnity model better ﬁts the data, Table 3.12 compares the observed vs.
expected number of shared customers between all three stores, and between each pair
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of stores. Numbers with an asterisk denote that the observed number falls within
95% posterior intervals.
The Aﬃnity model contains three of the four true values within posterior intervals.
However, the observed fourth value (i.e,. the number customers who purchased at
both B and F) which is not contained within the interval is only 1 customer greater
than the upper 95% interval (73). Relative to the benchmarks, the Aﬃnity model
provides superior mean estimates for all values except for the number of customers
shared by C and F.
Table 3.12: Customers shared between three synergistic partners
Observed Aﬃnity OWN NRU
B, C, F 21 18.1* 14.5 12.9
B, C 54 49.0* 44.2* 40.5
C, F 37 43.8* 38.4* 35.3*
B, F 74 62.4 57.2 53.2
3.4.2. Spillovers
Table 3.13 shows the average own and cross eﬀects (across customers and stores) for
each of the time epochs during which reward rates in the coalition program remained
unchanged. While the magnitude of own eﬀects tends to be greater than the mag-
nitude of the average store-to-store cross eﬀect, for a given store, the net impact of
the sum of the cross eﬀects from the 14 other stores is greater than own eﬀects. The
last row of the table shows the average sum of cross eﬀects received. After the pro-
gram's currency devaluation (between epochs 5 and 6), we ﬁnd that the magnitude
of the average own eﬀect increased from 1.07 to 1.39 while the magnitude of the aver-
age cross eﬀect decreased from -0.22 to -0.15. Together, these changes indicate that
the devaluation of the reward currency reduced the competitive reward interactions
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among the coalition's partner stores.
Table 3.13: Evolution of own and cross eﬀects
Epoch 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Avg. own eﬀect γj→j 1.19 1.24 1.13 1.06 1.07 1.39 1.39
Avg. cross eﬀect γk→j -0.26 -0.27 -0.26 -0.21 -0.22 -0.15 -0.13
Avg.
∑
k 6=j γk→j -3.87 -4.04 -3.87 -3.21 -3.31 -2.2 -1.95
3.4.2.1 Parameter estimates for non-reward utility and own eﬀects
Table 3.14 shows the posterior distributions of the population-level parameters for
non-reward utility and own eﬀects of rewards. We now evaluate the directions and
signiﬁcance of the own eﬀect parameters before vs. after the devaluation. However,
note that we cannot directly compare the magnitudes of the parameters before and
after the devaluation, since the reward rates across the coalition changed at the same
time. Before the devaluation, we ﬁnd that own-eﬀects are positive (κ¯0 > 0). Further-
more, stores that accept vouchers enjoy greater positive own-eﬀects than those that
do not (κ¯1 > 0). The posterior intervals of these positive own eﬀects are signiﬁcant
because they do not contain zero. After the devaluation, own eﬀects for stores that
accept vouchers are still positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. However, the
own eﬀects for stores that do not accept vouchers become insigniﬁcant (i.e., zero is
contained within the posterior interval for κ¯0+δκ0). These ﬁndings suggest that stores
that do not accept vouchers were the most aﬀected by the devaluation of the reward
currency.
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Table 3.14: Population-level parameters for non-reward utility and own eﬀects
Mean 5% 95%
µλ -1.49 -2.71 -0.24
κ¯0 0.19 0.09 0.31
κ¯1 0.37 0.21 0.54
κ¯0 + δκ0 0.08 -0.18 0.32
κ¯1 + δκ1 2.51 2.04 3.00
3.4.2.2 Tests of hypotheses on the mechanisms that drive cross-eﬀects
Tables 3.15 and 3.16 show the posterior distribution of the population-level param-
eters governing cross eﬀects, before (ψ¯) and after (ψ¯ + δ) the devaluation. We now
compare the valence and signiﬁcance of each parameter before and after the devalua-
tion. We cannot compare the magnitudes of ψ¯ and ψ¯+ δ without also accounting for
changes in reward rates. The magnitude comparison is shown in the next subsection.
Overall, the baseline-level of cross eﬀects across partner stores is negative, both before
and after the devaluation: ψ¯0 < 0, ψ¯0 + δψ0 < 0. Everything else equal, increases in
reward rates at one partner store are found to decrease purchase incidence at other
partner stores. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant because zero is not contained within the 95%
posterior intervals of ψ¯0 and ψ¯0 + δψ0 .
The remaining cross eﬀect parameters describe how cross eﬀects vary for stores that
accept vouchers and between stores that are closer in category and geographic aﬃnity.
We use the valence of each of these parameters to test Hypotheses 1, 2, 3(a) and 3(b).
Hypothesis 1 is supported if stores that accept vouchers are expected to receive more
positive (or less negative) cross eﬀects than stores that do not accept voucher redemp-
tions. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, both ψ¯1 and ψ¯1 + δψ1 have positive posterior
means, and their posterior intervals do not contain zero.
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Hypothesis 2 is supported if spillovers tend to be more negative between pairs of
stores that overlap in categories sold. While the posterior means of both ψ¯2 and
ψ¯2 + δψ2 are negative, consistent with the hypothesis, this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant for
ψ¯2 because zero is contained within the 95% posterior interval. More speciﬁcally, 85%
of the draws for ψ¯2 are negative, and 99% of the draws for ψ¯2 + δψ2 are negative.
Hypothesis 3(a) is supported if spillovers tend to be more positive (or less negative)
between pairs of nearby stores. Consistent with this hypothesis, the means and 95%
posterior intervals of both ψ¯3 and ψ¯3 + δψ3 are positive (i.e., zero is not contained
within the posterior intervals). One hundred percent of the draws for both ψ¯3 and
ψ¯3 + δψ3 are positive.
Finally, Hypothesis 3(b) predicts a negative interaction between nearby stores that are
also competitors. We observe this negative interaction before the devaluation: 100%
of the draws for ψ¯4 are negative. After the devaluation, however, the interaction term
ψ¯4 + δψ4 is not diﬀerent from zero (i.e., zero is contained within the 95% posterior
interval).
Table 3.15: Posterior distribution of β¯ (before devaluation)
β¯ Mean 5% 95% Signiﬁcant
ψ¯0 -0.16 -0.18 -0.15 yes
ψ¯1 0.09 0.07 0.11 yes
ψ¯2 -0.04 -0.12 0.02 no
ψ¯3 0.21 0.16 0.26 yes
ψ¯4 -0.53 -0.67 -0.40 yes
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Table 3.16: Posterior distribution of β¯ + δ (after devaluation)
β¯ + δ Mean 5% 95% Signiﬁcant
ψ¯0 + δψ0 -0.42 -0.45 -0.38 yes
ψ¯1 + δψ1 0.28 0.23 0.33 yes
ψ¯2 + δψ2 -0.23 -0.42 -0.06 yes
ψ¯3 + δψ3 0.33 0.21 0.45 yes
ψ¯4 + δψ4 0.31 -0.08 0.72 no
Table 3.17 shows additional support for these hypotheses at the individual level.
Although most consumers have parameter means consistent with most hypotheses
(column 3), the posterior intervals of most individuals tend to be very wide and
contain zero because we observe few purchases per individual. The fourth column
shows the percent of consumers for whom both (1) the hypothesis is supported and
(2) zero is not contained within the 95% posterior interval. The table is consistent with
the population-level parameters. Speciﬁcally, while most hypotheses are supported,
(1) the negative eﬀects of competition are mild, and (2) a negative interaction between
competing stores and nearby stores is observed before but not after the devaluation.
Table 3.17: Support of hypotheses at the individual level
β¯ + δ t(n) Consistent Consistent and signiﬁcant
E[ψ1it(n)] > 0 < t
∗ 82% 9.7%
E[ψ2it(n)] < 0 < t
∗ 62% 0.9%
E[ψ3it(n)] > 0 < t
∗ 87% 7%
E[ψ4it(n)] < 0 < t
∗ 98% 2.6%
E[ψ1it(n)] > 0 ≥ t∗ 100% 74%
E[ψ2it(n)] < 0 ≥ t∗ 84% 3.7%
E[ψ3it(n)] > 0 ≥ t∗ 94% 19%
E[ψ4it(n)] < 0 ≥ t∗ 9.3% 0%
Overall, the empirical support for the ﬁrst three hypotheses sheds light on how a
diverse store portfolio beneﬁts from a shared reward currency. In particular, we ﬁnd
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evidence that geographic proximity among partner stores attenuates competitive pres-
sures from stores that do sell similar categories. In addition, the results suggest that
oﬀering more generous reward policies (in particular, accepting voucher redemptions
and oﬀering higher reward rates) helps stores to compensate for the presence of com-
petitors within the coalition. Finally, we ﬁnd that the currency devaluation seems to
have reduced the intensity of competition for nearby category competitors.
We now use the aﬃnity links to test Hypotheses 4(a) and 4(b). These predict how
spillovers were aﬀected by the coalition's policy changes to both the value of rewards
and voucher fungibility. To evaluate both of these hypotheses, we compare the value
of the aﬃnity links using reward rates across the coalition oﬀered right before and
after the devaluation (these correspond to the rates during the 5th and 6th epochs
shown in Table 3.3).
Hypothesis 4(a) is supported if the average magnitude of spillovers decreased after the
devaluation. We test this hypothesis with the statistic sH4(a), where the expectation
is an average over all customers i, focal stores j, and other stores k. We expect
sH4(a) > 0.
sH4(a) = E[|γk→j,i,t∈epoch5| − |γk→j,i,t∈epoch6|] (3.14)
To test H4(b) we calculate the diﬀerence in spillovers for stores that accept vs. do not
accept vouchers. H4(b) is supported if this diﬀerence increased after the increase in
voucher fungibility. We test this hypothesis with the statistic sH4(b), which we expect
to be negative.
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sH4(b) =
(
E{j:Vj=1}[γk→j,i,t∈epoch5]− E{j:Vj=0}[γk→j,i,t∈epoch5]
)
− (E{j:Vj=1}[γk→j,i,t∈epoch6]− E{j:Vj=0}[γk→j,i,t∈epoch6]) (3.15)
The posterior distributions of the statistics sH4(a) and sH4(b) across draws support
both hypotheses. The posterior distribution of sH4(a) rejects the null hypothesis: the
mean across draws is 0.26, and the 95% posterior interval does not contain zero (0.20,
0.33). The mean posterior distribution of sH4(b) equals -0.005, consistent with Hy-
pothesis 4(b), but the eﬀect is small and zero is contained within the 95% posterior
interval (-0.12, 0.13). Thus, we do not ﬁnd strong evidence that the coalition's de-
cision to increase voucher fungibility signiﬁcantly impacted reward spillovers across
the partners.
3.4.2.3 Market structure based on reward cross eﬀects
We now visualize the competitive landscape across the partner stores by visualizing
the reward spillovers to describe the coalition's market structure. We use a heat map
to visualize the aﬃnity links that characterize reward spillover eﬀects. Recall that
an aﬃnity link γk→j,i,t(n) represents the reward spillovers sent by store k to store j.
The value of the link varies across customers and across seven epochs during which
reward rates across the stores remained constant.
The following illustration (Figure 3.2) visualizes the aﬃnity links across stores (av-
eraged across customers) during epoch 5 (right before the devaluation). Red entries
denote negative spillovers and blue entries denote positive ones. The scales are asym-
metric: the red-to-white scale ranges from -0.9 to zero, and white-to-blue scale ranges
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from 0 to 0.09. Each non-diagonal entry represents the aﬃnity link sent by the column
store to the row store.
The heat map reveals interesting patterns of competition within the coalition. First
we note the few net positive spillovers observed. Stores B, C, and F (one jewelry store
and two health stores) form a love triangle: almost all give and receive positive
reward spillovers from each other (except C→F). In contrast, some pairs of stores
have spillovers that are asymmetric in valence. For example, store K only receives
negative spillovers from other partners, but it beneﬁts stores B, C, and N with positive
spillovers.
It is also evident that a trio of sport and shoe stores L, M and N form a cluster
sending negative spillovers to other partners. The stores most aﬀected by these neg-
ative spillovers are B, F, G, and O, which operate in diﬀerent categories and have
diﬀerent voucher policies. However, each of these shares the same location, and is
relatively far from the trio L, M and N. Thus, B, F, G and O seem to mark the center
of a geographic hub that is hurt when L, M and N attract customers to shop further
away with higher rewards.
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Figure 3.2: Heat map of spillover links
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3.4.2.4 Competitive clout and vulnerability of reward spillovers
The heat map shows substantial asymmetry in how links are sent and received across
stores. We summarize the asymmetry of the links received and sent across stores with
an approach based on Kamakura and Russell (1989), which summarizes negative cross
price elasticities among brands using measures of vulnerability and competitive clout.
In our setting, vulnerability captures how sensitive a store is to other's reward rates
and competitive clout captures how inﬂuential the reward rates of a store are on other
partners.
For ease of illustration we suppress customer and time indices of the aﬃnity links to
deﬁne the new metrics. Competitive clout sums over the absolute value of the aﬃnity
links sent by a store to other's in the network. Vulnerability sums the absolute
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value of the aﬃnity links received by a store from the rewards of other partners.
The absolute value allows these measures to characterize how strongly ﬁrms inﬂuence
each other, whether it is through negative or positive spillovers.
Cloutj =
∑
k 6=j
|γj→k| (3.16)
V ulnerabilityj =
∑
k 6=j
|γk→j| (3.17)
Figure 3.3 uses these metrics to visualize the coalition's market structure before and
after the devaluation (i.e., using the reward rates during epochs 5 and 6). Analogous
to the heat map, competitive clout and vulnerability were calculated using the links
averaged across each customer's posterior mean. Measures of net clout and net vul-
nerability (i.e., recalculating the measures without the absolute values on the links),
which allow positive and negative spillovers to cancel out, yield similar insights since
the few positive spillovers we ﬁnd are small in magnitude.
Figure 3.3 illustrates that the devaluation of rewards greatly narrowed the diﬀerences
in both clout and vulnerability across stores. Overall, stores C, I, N, and L can be
considered the strongest partners, since each have relatively low vulnerability or a
relatively high clout in both epochs. Similarly, D, F and O can be considered the
weakest partners, with a relatively high vulnerability to other's rewards and low
competitive clout.
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Figure 3.3: Vulnerability vs. Competitive Clout of Reward Spillovers
2 3 4 5
0
2
4
6
Before devaluation
Vulnerability
C
lo
ut
A B
C DE F
GHI J
K
L M
N
O
2 3 4 5
0
2
4
6
After devaluation
Vulnerability
C
lo
ut
A
B
C DE F
G
H
I
J
K
LMN
O
3.5. General Discussion
In this chapter, we have developed a multi-store purchase incidence model to measure
reward spillovers sent and received across diverse partners of a coalition program. The
model parameters were used to test hypotheses on which mechanisms drive the types
of spillovers across the stores.
First, we found evidence that stores are more likely to receive more favorable re-
ward spillovers if they allow customers to redeem reward vouchers. This ﬁnding has
important implications for the coalition, because although stores are currently very
cognizant of the costs of accepting vouchers, without access to the coalition's data
across stores, they cannot observe the potential beneﬁts received from more favorable
reward spillovers.
Second, we found that the aﬃnity between partner stores can explain the types of
spillovers across them. Stores that compete which are geographically close within
the city are more likely to send and receive more favorable spillovers. These ﬁndings
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can be used to alleviate competitive concerns within the coalition, since a partner
can oﬀset competitive pressures by oﬀering more generous reward policies: either
by increasing the reward rate that it oﬀers to customers or by accepting voucher
redemptions.
Third, we found that the devaluation of the reward currency in 2009 decreased the
magnitude of spillovers across partners. This ﬁnding highlights the value of sharing
a reward currency across stores: rewards with higher value change the way stores
compete for customers through reward spillovers. We also found that the coalition's
measures to increase the fungibility of vouchers had a limited impact on spillovers
received by stores that do accept vouchers.
The spillovers characterize the market positioning of partner retail stores of a coalition
loyalty program based on how customers are observed purchasing across. A heat
map is used to visually position stores with a common spillover metric although
several of these do not sell the same categories and purchases across stores is sparse.
Asymmetry in the spillovers are measured using competitive clout and vulnerability
metrics (Kamakura and Russell 1989). The positioning heat map and asymmetry
metrics help to identify stores with a potential for cross-marketing opportunities.
Our plans for future work in this area include using the model to evaluate policy
counterfactuals such as imposing changes to tier-level reward rates. We also plan
to incorporate demographic information to characterize diﬀerences in customer-level
spillovers. Finally, while this paper focuses on a coalition program with brick-and-
mortar stores, future research can explore the spillover interactions between partners
with both brick-and-mortar and online outlets.
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CHAPTER 4 : Concluding Reﬂections on Emerging Loyalty Programs
4.1. Summary of contributions
This chapter summarizes the contributions of this dissertation, discusses their impli-
cations for managers, and identiﬁes trends that continue to increase the fungibility of
rewards. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future research.
The introductory chapter developed a unifying framework to study emerging types of
loyalty programs which provide increasingly fungible rewards. Chapters 2 and 3 each
delved into issues pertaining to each of the two dimensions of the framework: the
rate at which rewards can be redeemed (linear vs. non-linear) and the multiplicity of
actively participating retailers.
Chapter 2 modeled data from a linear program to generate insights into why cus-
tomers seem to persistently stockpile points. We ﬁnd empirical evidence suggesting
that prospect theory and mental accounting (Thaler 1985) can partially explain why
customers in linear loyalty programs are motivated to stockpile points for long periods
of time, despite the absence of economic incentives for doing so from the retailer. By
mentally booking gains and losses of cash separately from gains and losses of points,
customers can be intrinsically incentivized to save points up to a certain amount
before redeeming them in a linear program. This psychological motivation is dis-
tinguished from economic and cognitive redemption costs. The data suggests that
customers seem to be driven mostly by this psychological motivation as well as by
cognitive ﬁxed costs of redeeming, but less so by economic costs (i.e., the value of
foregone points).
These ﬁndings have implications for understanding why even in non-linear programs,
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many customers often stockpile points above and beyond the retailer's requirements
to redeem. Furthermore, they suggest that eﬀorts to encourage redemptions should
consider diﬀerent ways of framing these in terms of gains and losses of cash and points.
Chapter 3 developed a multi-store purchase incidence model to measure reward
spillovers across diverse partner stores in a coalition loyalty program. The model
is used to test hypotheses showing that the spillovers between stores are driven by
reward redemption policies and aﬃnity between stores. Reward spillovers are visu-
alized to position the diverse set of stores in a common map that characterizes their
market structure.
Our results allow both the managers of partner stores as well as the third-party
managers of the coalition program to better understand the nature of competition
within the coalition. Most importantly, we illustrate that the value of a shared re-
ward currency inﬂuences how partner stores compete with each other through reward
spillovers. This work on coalition programs is also relevant to ﬁrms such as theme
parks and casinos which reward customers across their own umbrella of services.
4.2. Recommendations for future research
We provide directions for future research in coalition loyalty programs by discussing
three examples from the perspective of each of the three parties involved: customers,
partner retailers, and the third-party coalition operator. From the perspective of
customers, it would be interesting and challenging to model the evolution of the
customer lifetime cycle not only at a speciﬁc retailer, but across sectors, geographic
locations, and across the program. From the perspective of retailers, more work is
needed to understand the impact of entry and exit to and from a coalition network
(variation that was not present in our data). Finally, from the perspective of the
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operator, improved store-level analytics can be provided to partners by quantifying
and leveraging the value of shared data. For example, while a store may suspect
attrition for a speciﬁc customer, the coalition has more speciﬁc data on whether that
customer has recently shopped at nearby or competing retailers.
4.3. Emerging trends
Having summarized the contributions of the preceding chapters and avenues for fu-
ture research, we conclude by highlighting trends that are continuing to increase the
fungibility of rewards in emerging loyalty programs. In particular, we discuss four
examples of innovations that are further increasing the fungibility of rewards which
pose new challenges for the managers of loyalty programs. While this dissertation
focuses on retail loyalty programs, we examine other types of ﬁrms, including airline
carriers and hotel chains, to identify these trends.
First, the digitalization of rewards eases the exchange of information among parties.
This trend has led some ﬁrms to lose tight control over the fungibility of their own
rewards to third parties. Mileage-tracking websites are one prominent example which
allow customers to keep track of various loyalty programs in one place, and even
allow customers to more easily compare the value of points across competing airline
carriers, hotels, and car rental companies (McCartney 2011).
Second, the existence of increasing competition pressures companies to match rewards
earned at competitors. Many hotel chains and airline carriers have status matching
programs which reward customers with special status if they have earned a similar
status at a competitor. One example is the Status Match . . . No Catch policy at
Best Western Hotels & Resorts which matches a customer's elite status in any other
hotel loyalty program, free of charge. These programs make single-ﬁrm programs
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similar to coalition programs, in which a customer can earn a special status valid
across all partners even though the bulk of his spending was directed at a few ﬁrms.
Third, ﬁrms are facing pressure to adapt their programs to leverage mobile technolo-
gies. By doing so, rewards have the potential to become truly redeemable anytime,
anyplace. Finally, competitive pressures also encourage ﬁrms to increasingly allow
customers to more easily transfer points to other customers, lowering the ability of
points to impose switching costs.
To conclude, this dissertation has outlined a framework to study novel challenges in
emerging types of loyalty programs, provided valuable contributions with managerial
implications, and highlighted promising avenues for future research to build upon our
work.
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Appendices
APPENDIX 1: PROOF OF EXISTENCE OF AN INDIFFERENCE
POINT
This appendix presents a theorem showing that when there are two S-shaped value
functions w(x) and v(x), an indiﬀerence point s∗ can be reached as long as w(x)
is steeper than v(x) for large losses (i.e., when there are many points available to
redeem). The subscripts are dropped in the proofs for simplicity.
We begin with brief propositions that characterize how the variable beneﬁts and
costs of redeeming vary with redeemable points. These proofs stem directly from
two properties of an S-shaped value function: over the loss domain (x < 0), a value
function u(x) is increasing (Property 1: u′ > 0) and convex (Property 2: u′′ > 0).
Proposition 1. The beneﬁt of redeeming b(s˜ij;mij) = w(−mij + s˜ij) − w(−mij) is
a strictly increasing and strictly convex function of redeemable points s˜ij: b
′ > 0;
b′′ > 0.
Proof: The ﬁrst derivative b′(s˜) = w′(−m + s˜) > 0 comes from Property 1 of the
value function. The second derivative b′′(s˜) = w′′(−m+ s˜) > 0 comes from Property
2 of the value function.
Proposition 2. Denote the variable cost of redeeming by c(s˜ij;mij) = −v(−s˜ij). The
variable cost is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of redeemable points
s˜ij: c
′ > 0; c′′ < 0.
Proof: The ﬁrst derivative v′(−s˜) < 0 comes from Property 1 of the value function.
Thus, c′(s˜) = −v′(−s˜)>0. The second derivative c′′(s˜) = v′′(−s˜) < 0 comes from
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Property 2 of the value function.
Now we introduce a condition that formalizes when w(x) is steeper in losses than
v(x) (i.e., spending cash should be more painful than spending points) at least for
large prices:
Asymmetry condition: There exists a price m′ such that for all m > m′, |w(−m)| >
|v(−m)|.
Theorem 1. Given the asymmetry condition, a threshold s∗ > 0 such that z(s∗,mij) =
0 is guaranteed to exist for prices mij greater than some ﬁnite level m¯ij.
Proof: The net utility of redeeming is decomposed into a variable component and a
ﬁxed component, z(s) = q(s˜)−f , where q(s˜) = b(s˜)−c(s˜), and the ﬁxed costs include
the opportunity cost of foregone points and the transaction cost, f = v(mr) + c.
When s˜ = 0, q(0) = 0 and thus z(s˜) = −f < 0. When s˜ = m, q(m) = v(−m) −
w(−m) > 0 ∀m > m′ by the asymmetry condition. Since f ′′(m) < 0 and q′′(m) >
0 ∀m > m′, there exists a price m¯ such that q(m) > f(m) ∀m > m¯. When q(m) >
f(m), then z(m) > 0 and thus, a threshold s∗ such that z(s∗) = 0 is guaranteed to
exist by the continuity of z(s).
APPENDIX 2: PARAMETER RECOVERY FOR MA
This appendix illustrates an example of parameter recovery for MA's population-
level parameters based on our observed data. We use the independent variables in
the complete dataset (10219 purchase occasions from 346 individuals) to simulate a
new set of redemption choices. First we generate the βi parameters for each indi-
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vidual according to Equation 2.8, where µ is set close to values estimated from our
dataset: [-1.7, -0.3, -0.64, -3, 0.1, 1.8], and Ω is set to an identity matrix times 2.9.
Each individual's simulated βi parameters, their observed prices, and their observed
stockpiles are then used to generate a new sequence of redemption choices for each of
their observed purchase occasions, according to the MA model (Equation 2.7). The
redemption rate in the simulated dataset is 2.5%.
We ran three independent chains from diﬀerent starting values, and assess their con-
vergence using the Gelman and Rubin (1992) diagnostic of between-to-within chain
variance. We ran the model for 5000 iterations and the last 3000 iterations of each
chain (9000 draws in total) were used for analysis. Table 4.1 compares the actual and
estimated untransformed population-level parameters. Each of the true population-
level parameters is contained within 95% posterior intervals. The errors for the
individual-level parameters λwi, λvi, awi, avi, hi, and ci are on average 0.31, -0.13,
-0.05, 0.04, 0.03, and 0.04 respectively, and the mean absolute percentage errors are
25.9%, 12.5%, 20.4%, 104.9%, 14.6%, and 16.6%, indicating good model ﬁt.
Table 4.1: Parameter recovery for MA
Parameter Actual Estimated Error 2.5% Bound 97.5% Bound
λw 1.18 1.40 0.22 1.08 2.18
λv 1.74 1.51 -0.23 1.18 2.00
aw 0.35 0.28 -0.07 0.20 0.35
av 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.14
h 0.52 0.56 0.03 0.20 0.89
c 1.80 1.86 0.06 1.29 2.36
APPENDIX 3: A RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS ALTERNATIVE
This appendix empirically explores the directional predictions of a Rational Expec-
tations (RE) model, an enriched SLA model in which consumers are forward-looking
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with rational expectations on the timing and size of their future shopping needs. A
customer in this model views points as a means to save cash in the future, and does
not inherently value points in a separate account. Behavior can be driven by fore-
gone points and ﬁxed non-monetary costs, but not separate mental accounts. For
simplicity, we omit the i subscripts when presenting the individual-level model.
Consider a consumer who is forward looking over an inﬁnite horizon and who values
monetary incentives with a linear utility, as shown in Equation 4.1. As before, when
the customer redeems, he pays −m + s˜ instead of −m, and can also incur a non-
monetary cost of redeeming c.
u(y|s,m) =

−βmm if y = 0
−βm(m− s˜)− c if y = 1
(4.1)
As in MA, this consumer understands that redeeming aﬀects his future stockpile s′
(Equation 4.2). However, he does not value all future points equally. The value for s′
depends on how and when he expects to use them. We assume rational expectations
on future shopping needsm′ and future inter-purchase times. Let q be the distribution
of m′ conditional on the current basket price m. Future payoﬀs are discounted by
β, interpreted as the daily discount rate δ times the expected duration until the
next purchase. The consumer optimizes his redemptions to maximize expected total
discounted utility (Equation 4.3).
s′ =

s+mr if y = 0
s− s˜ if y = 1
(4.2)
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V (s,m) = max
y∈{0,1}
u(y|s,m) + βE[V (s′,m′)|s,m, y] (4.3)
We use Chebyshev regression (Judd 1998), a ﬂexible non-parametric approach, to
approximate the value function V (s,mlevel) at each of the two price levels: low and
high. For details on the implementation of this approach, see the next section of
this appendix called Value function estimation. Discretizing m allows us to convey
the intuition behind the basic tradeoﬀs that determine how redemptions vary with
shopping needs. The estimates are used to calculate zRE(s,mlevel), the diﬀerence
between the utility of redeeming and not redeeming in the current period (Equation
4.4). The consumer redeems when zRE(s,m) > 0. Let s
∗ be the stockpile level at
which zRE(s
∗,m)=0.
zRE(s,m) = βss˜− c+ β[E[V (s′,m′)|s,m, 1]− E[V (s′,m′)|s,m, 0]] (4.4)
We compare zRE(s
∗,mlow) and zRE(s∗,mhigh) to intuitively describe the model's di-
rectional predictions under two cases: when c is 0 and when c is large. When c = 0,
foregone points drive stockpiling behavior. Since foregone points are proportional to
m, a consumer will prefer to redeem on a small price rather than a high price. In other
words, s∗ increases with m (i.e., zRE(s∗,mlow) < zRE(s∗,mhigh)). When c is substan-
tial, both the economic and cognitive motivations are allowed to drive behavior. In
this case, s∗ instead decreases with m. Intuitively, he stockpiles longer to save more
at each redemption. A large c may seem necessary ex-ante to explain the observed
persistent stockpiling because (i) foregone points are small in magnitude (only 1% of
the basket price) and (ii) individuals often neglect to consider the absence of potential
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positive cash ﬂows (Frederick et al. 2009).
To recap, RE expects redemptions to decrease with m if c is small, and to instead
increase with m if c is substantial. To explore whether either of these predictions
are directionally consistent with our data, we examine the individual-level estimates
from SLA, a model linear in s˜ and m. At the individual-level, βsi is positive for
100% of customers (with a 95% posterior interval ranging from 0.022 to 0.250 across
individuals), and βmi is negative for most customers (95.7%) and not diﬀerent from
zero for the rest with a 95% posterior interval ranging from -0.151 to 0.003 across
individuals). So, to be consistent with this data, RE implies that foregone points (the
economic motivation) must be the main determinant of persistent stockpiling and not
cognitive ﬁxed costs. In contrast, MA can capture this empirical pattern regardless
of whether a customer considers foregone points (to see why, refer back to Table 5
and set avi = 0).
A second exploratory analysis did not ﬁnd preliminary evidence for RE in the data.
We ran a logistic regression (Equation 4.5) of redemptions with the observed running
means of each individual's shopping needs m¯ij (i.e., m¯ij =
1
j
∑j
k=1mik) and of the
days between purchases d¯ij, two factors that should inﬂuence consumers with rational
expectations above and beyond s˜ij and mij. Fixed eﬀects αi were added to control
for diﬀerences across individuals1.
logit(pij) ∼ α0 + αi + βss˜ij + βmmij + γmm¯ij + γdd¯ij (4.5)
1The advantage of using running means rather than the mean across the entire individual's
observed purchases is that it allows us to control for individual-level ﬁxed eﬀects. This helps overcome
the diﬃculty of disentangling model diﬀerences from heterogeneity (e.g., customers with longer
durations may have systematically diﬀerent discount rates, and the distributions of shopping needs
may tend to vary with the value for cash across individuals).
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While RE with low c expects that redemptions decrease with expected shopping needs
(γm < 0) and increase with expected durations (γd > 0), both of these parameters
were positive and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (p-values 0.50 and 0.99 respec-
tively). The control variables were consistent with the results from SLA: βs is positive
(4.5 ∗ 10−3, p-value < 0.001) and βm is negative (−5.2 ∗ 10−4, p-value = 0.019) .
In summary, to be consistent with this dataset, RE implies that persistent stockpil-
ing must be mostly driven by the economic incentive of foregone points and not by
cognitive costs. In contrast (as discussed in the chapter), MA ﬁnds that diﬀerences
in redemption behavior across individuals are mostly driven by cognitive and psycho-
logical motivations to redeem (ﬁxed costs and separate accounts). While we do not
rule out either model, the common neglect of foregone gains (Frederick et al. 2009)
brings in question the plausibility of RE for this dataset.
Value function estimation
The value function is approximated using orthogonal polynomials on 5 Chebyshev
nodes (i.e., the zeros of a Chebyshev polynomial) over the stockpile levels as:
V˜ (s,mlevel) =
∑n
k=1 ck,levelTk(s), where Tk(s) denotes the Chebyshev basis function
of order k, and ck,level are the coeﬃcients. The 2n coeﬃcients are estimated by
numerically solving the system of 2n equations: 0 = V˜ (s,mlevel)− V (s,mlevel).
In the example shown in Figure 4.1, we used the following example parameters: c = 0,
βm = 1, β = 0.98, mlow = 3, mhigh = 7, q(mlow|mlow) = 0.2, and q(mhigh|mhigh) =
0.9. The intuitive results do not change when the transition matrix q is modiﬁed
so that mlow is more common than mhigh. The kinks at the maximum redeemable
amount (mκ) reﬂect that redeemable points at any purchase occasion are bounded
at 50% of the basket price. The consumer persistently stockpiles up to the level s∗
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at which zRE(s
∗,m)=0. When c = 0, the ﬁgure shows that s∗ increases with m (i.e.,
zRE(s
∗,mlow) < zRE(s∗,mhigh)). The same intuition holds when the transition matrix
q is modiﬁed so that mlow is more common than mhigh. When cognitive costs c are
substantial, the consumer stockpiles longer and redeems on basket prices that are
high instead of low. To see this graphically, refer again to Figure 4.1. As c increases,
both curves move down. When c is large enough so that the zero crossing point occurs
once zRE(s,mhigh) has surpassed zRE(s,mlow), the customer's threshold s
∗ decreases
with m.
Figure 4.1: Net utilities when shopping needs are low versus high
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APPENDIX 4: PARAMETER RECOVERY FOR AFFINITY MODEL
This appendix illustrates an example of parameter recovery for the parameters of the
Aﬃnity model. We used the observed covariates from the 15 stores to simulate a new
set of purchase choices for 50 individuals. The true population-level parameters were
chosen to be close to those estimated from the observed dataset. We ran a single
chain for 10000 iterations (after thinning every 20 iterations) and used the last 8000
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to compare the posterior distributions to the actual values. Table 4.2 shows that each
of the true population-level parameters, as well as the true mean of θij, is contained
within 95% posterior intervals.
Table 4.2: Parameter recovery for Aﬃnity Model
Parameter Actual Estimated 2.5% Bound 97.5% Bound
µλ -2.00 -1.76 -2.19 -1.29
κ¯0 0.20 -0.01 -0.40 0.31
κ¯1 0.40 0.72 0.36 1.15
ψ¯0 -0.20 -0.30 -0.43 -0.18
ψ¯1 0.10 0.15 0.03 0.27
ψ¯2 0.00 0.03 -0.10 0.16
ψ¯3 0.20 0.20 0.07 0.33
ψ¯4 -0.60 -0.63 -0.79 -0.46
δκ0 -0.10 -0.05 -0.17 0.07
δκ1 2.00 1.90 1.72 2.09
δψ0 -0.20 -0.18 -0.20 -0.17
δψ1 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.12
δψ2 -0.20 -0.20 -0.26 -0.15
δψ3 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.13
δψ4 0.80 0.69 0.57 0.81
mean(θij) −5e−4 −5e−5 −7.8e−3 7.7e−3
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